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ABSTRACT
Reliability Techniques for Data Communication and Storage in FPGA-Based Circuits
Yubo Li
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Doctor of Philosophy
This dissertation studies the effects of radiation-induced single-event upsets (SEUs)
on field-programmable gate array(FPGA)-based circuits. It analyzes and quantifies a special
case in data communication, that is, the synchronization issue of signals when they are sent
across clock domains in triple modular redundancy (TMR) circuits with the presence of
SEUs. After demonstrating that synchronizing errors cannot be eliminated in such case,
this dissertation continues to present novel synchronizer designs that can guarantee reliable
synchronization of triplicated signals. Fault injection tests then show that the proposed
synchronizers provide between 6 and 10 orders of magnitude longer mean time to failure
(MTTF) than unmitigated synchronizers.
This dissertation also studies the reliability of block random access memory (BRAM)
on FPGAs. By investigating several previous reliability models for single-error correction/
double-error detection (SEC/DED) memory with scrubbing, this dissertation proposes two
novel MTTF models that are suitable for FPGA applications. The first one considers nonuniform write rates for probabilistic write scrubbing, and the second one combines deterministic scrubbing and probabilistic scrubbing into a single model. The proposed models
reveal the impact of memory access patterns on the reliability of BRAMs. Monte Carlo
simulations then demonstrate the correctness of the proposed models. At last, the memory
access patterns of a type of FPGA application, digital signal processing (DSP) is studied,
and mitigation mechanisms for DSP applications are discussed.

Keywords: FPGA, reliability, single event upset, synchronizer, triple modular redundancy,
block RAM, scrubbing, Markov model, mean time to failure
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation
For applications involving computing tasks, there are several alternative solutions:

Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), general purpose microprocessors, and Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Among the three methods, FPGAs are an increasingly
attractive technology due to their low design costs and ability to support post-deployment
design modifications. Compared to ASICs, whose functions cannot be altered after fabrication, FPGAs have the advantage of being reprogrammable and providing a lower cost per
device in small quantities [2], [3]. Compared to microprocessors, which accomplish computing tasks by software execution, FPGAs can provide much higher performance by completing
the tasks using hardware [4].
FPGAs are especially favorable for space applications. The first reason is that FPGAs are reprogrammable, thus different circuits can be implemented based on mission requirements. This can reduce the load and the power consumption of the spacecraft. The
post-deployment re-programmability also allows the implemented circuit to be modified for
upgrades and bug fixes [2]. The second reason is that FPGAs cost less than ASICs when
the deployment number is small. ASICs have high Non-recurring Engineering (NRE) cost,
or one-time investment for developing a new product, while FPGAs have virtually none.
Although a single FPGA costs more than manufacturing an ASIC, FPGAs still have lower
cost per device because space applications usually require a small number of parts.
Static Random-Access Memory(SRAM)-based FPGAs store information and data
using SRAMs. However, SRAMs are susceptible to radiation-induced single-event upsets
(SEUs) [5]. An SEU is a change of state caused by ions or electro-magnetic radiation
striking a sensitive node in a micro-electronic device. Therefore, SRAM-based FPGAs are
1

also susceptible to SEUs, especially in harsh environments such as space, which contains
abundant high-energy particles and cosmic rays. On SRAM-based FPGAs, an SEU may
cause a fault in configuration memory (which controls user logic and routing) or in user
memory. In an FPGA design, configuration memory holds the configuration and routing
information of configurable logic blocks (CLBs) and the initial contents of user memories.
User data is the data generated by the circuit, usually stored in Block RAMs (BRAMs),
LUTRAMs, and Shift Register LUTs (SRLs). Therefore, it is crucial to protect both the
configuration memory and the user memory in harsh environments such as space in order to
guarantee the functionality of the circuit.
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is a widely used fault-tolerant technique for
FPGAs. TMR uses three identical copies of the original circuit or module and additional
voting logic to mitigate SEUs. If an erroneous output is produced by one of the three
copies, it will be outvoted by the other two correct outputs at the voting logic. TMR has
been proved to be the most effective mitigation technique for configuration memory as well
as user memory [6], [7]. On the other hand, the overhead of TMR is huge because the
triplicated circuit plus the voting logic requires more than 3X in resources. Depending on
the size of the original circuit, the overhead in area of TMR can be as high as 6X [6].
Although TMR works well in many situations, it has two problems. First, TMR is not
perfect, that is, it still could fail in some cases. One such case exists in TMR circuits which
cross asynchronous clock domains. When crossing clock domains, the triplicated signals may
arrive at the receiving domain at different time instants because of different wiring delays
and therefore may be sampled by the receiving domain in different clock cycles. Combined
with SEU, this timing issue could lead to the failure of TMR. The research conducted to
solve this timing problem will be introduced in more detail in Subsection 1.2.1.
Second, the huge cost of TMR in area makes it less favorable than other alternatives for some structures. For example, error correcting codes (ECCs) are often applied to
memories because they have much less area overhead compared to TMR. On Xilinx FPGAs,
block RAMs (BRAMs) are used to store information. On Xilinx Virtex-4 and later devices,
BRAMs are protected by built-in single error correction/double error detection (SEC/DED)
code, a kind of ECC [8], [9]. To evaluate the reliability of SEC/DED memories, others have
2

proposed several mathematical models [10], [11]. However, these models are inaccurate because they overlook the repair effect of write operations on the memories. Therefore new
models that give more accurate estimates of reliability are needed. This research that derives
and validates new models is introduced in more detail in Subsection 1.2.2.
1.2

Summary of Research
The functions of an FPGA application can be divided into three categories: com-

puting information, storing information, and communicating information. This dissertation
will focus on improving the reliability of FPGA-based designs by investigating mitigation
techniques in two of the three fields: information communication and information storage.
The work can be divided into two parts.
In the first part, reliable information communication is studied. New synchronization
techniques are proposed and validated for sending triplicated signals across asynchronous
clock domains in the presence of SEUs. The focus of the second part is to study reliable
information storage. New reliability models for BRAMs with non-uniform access distributions are proposed, derived and validated. In addition, memory access patterns of different
types of FPGA applications are investigated to provide guidance on how memories should
be protected based on their usage.
1.2.1

Information Communication: Reliable Synchronization Techniques
As mentioned above, TMR is a common fault-tolerant technique to mitigate the effects

of SEUs in the FPGA configuration memory, especially in space environments. Using TMR,
three copies of the same circuit are created with the purpose of masking out a single failure
in any one of the three copies. This masking is accomplished by means of a majority (twoout-of-three) voter on the circuit outputs [12]. TMR requires triplication of the protected
logic (part or all of the design) and addition of voting logic. Therefore the area cost of TMR
is more than 3x.
When a circuit crosses asynchronous clock domains, however, simple TMR is not sufficient to protect it (shown in Figure 1.1). This is because when crossing asynchronous clock
domains, the three copies of the sent signal may arrive in the receiver’s domain at different
3

time instants and therefore may be sampled in different clock cycles by the synchronizers
in the receiver’s domain. This issue is named as asynchronous sampling uncertainty in [13].
When an SEU occurs in the circuit, the combined effect of SEU and asynchronous sampling uncertainty may lead to wrong outputs of the triplicated voters(Output A, Output B,
Output C in Figure 1.1).

TMR
Circuit

Copy A

Copy A

Voter

Output A

Copy B

Copy B

Voter

Output B

Copy C

Copy C

Voter

Output C

Sender’s domain

TMR
Circuit

Receiver’s domain

Figure 1.1: A TMR Circuit Crossing Clock Domains.

Overall, the functional correctness of an FPGA-based TMR circuit with clock domain
crossing may be threatened by three problems: 1) meta-stability, 2) asynchronous sampling
uncertainty, and 3) SEUs. This dissertation will analyze and quantify each of these problems,
and demonstrate the effects of asynchronous sampling uncertainty with regard to triplicated
clock domain crossings. The dissertation will further present a number of TMR-compatible
synchronizers, detail the timing constraints on their use, and then use fault injection and
reliability models to demonstrate their operation and Mean Time To Failure(MTTF) characteristics.
1.2.2

Information Storage: Reliable BRAM Storage
Block RAMs (BRAMs) are widely used in Xilinx FPGAs to store user data. But

the storage reliability can be jeopardized by SEUs. In order to protect the BRAMs in
Xilinx FPGAs, built-in ECCs are employed. Although TMR provides better mitigation
against SEUs compared to ECCs, it is prohibitively expensive in area cost and thus is not
4

preferred. Among ECCs, single error correction/double error detection (SEC/DED) codes
are the most commonly used for memories. This dissertation investigates the reliability
of BRAMs in terms of MTTF in FPGA-based designs. The protecting mechanisms for
BRAMs are discussed, and it is pointed out that during normal memory operation, write
operations can provide mitigation against SEUs. Previous models overlook the repair effect
of write operations and therefore underestimate the memory reliability. In addition, write
access is usually not uniform over all memory locations, and this fact could also affect the
reliability of memories. In this dissertation, new reliability models are proposed and derived
for SEC/DED memories with non-uniform write distributions. The new models will be able
to provide more accurate MTTF estimates compared to existing models, and will allow for
insights into the impact of write rate on memory reliability.
Another contribution of the dissertation is exploring the memory access patterns of
BRAMs in FPGA-based designs. A Digital Signal Processing (DSP) design will be investigated as a case of study to reveal the impact of memory access patterns on BRAM reliability.
The memory access patterns, combined with the proposed MTTF models, will provide designers with a better estimate for the reliability of their designs.
1.3

Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters:
• Chapter 2 introduces the background of radiation-induced SEUs and the mechanisms
of failures in FPGAs. In addition, various types of mitigation techniques against SEUs
are introduced. Finally, evaluation criteria and modeling techniques for reliability are
discussed.
• Chapter 3 analyzes the issues of TMR circuits with clock domain crossing: metastability, sampling uncertainty, and SEUs. It describes the experiments used for quantifying the effect of meta-stability and sampling uncertainty. Furthermore, the combined
effects of TMR, sampling uncertainty, and signal skew are analyzed and discussed.
• Chapter 4 proposes several mitigation solutions for the problem of TMR circuits
crossing clock domains. The proposed synchronizers are then analyzed for functional
5

correctness. This chapter also presents the fault injection tests conducted to validate
the proposed synchronizers.
• Chapter 5 gives an overview of prior work on reliability models for memories. The
models are then compared and analyzed. This analysis leads to the motivations for
proposing new reliability models.
• Chapter 6 proposes and derives two new reliability models for SEC/DED memories.
Detailed mathematical derivation is given. Then the proposed models are analyzed and
insights are presented to reveal the impact of write distribution on the reliability of
the memory. Finally, the results of Monte Carlo simulations are presented to validate
the proposed models.
• Chapter 7 describes an experiment for collecting BRAM access patterns from real
FPGA applications. The experiment is on a DSP circuit and reveals the characteristics
of write distributions in such applications. In addition, this chapter tries to provide
a guide on how to use the proposed models to help make design decisions for reliable
memory systems.
• Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation, makes conclusive remarks and points out
tasks for future work.
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Chapter 2
Radiation Effects and Reliability of FPGAs
Spacecraft such as satellites and space stations operate in Earth’s orbit, an extreme
environment filled by radiation. In such an environment, electronic devices on spacecraft
are exposed to cosmic rays, which are from three sources: galactic cosmic rays from outside
the solar system, anomalous cosmic rays from the edge of the heliopause, and solar energetic
particles from the Sun [14]. The high energy particles in cosmic rays, such as neutrons
and ions, along with protons trapped in the Earth’s magnetic field pose great challenges to
electronic devices in space because they can cause Single Event Effects (SEEs), which lead
to circuit malfunction [15].
Another source of charged particles for integrated circuits is the impurities in packaging materials and the silicon substrate [16]. The trace amounts of uranium and thorium
isotopes will emit alpha particles as they decay. The lead isotope

210

Pb in the lead solders

used for the solder bumps in flip-chip packaging is impossible to remove even if the solder is
purified of other radioactive elements[16]. Although
decay chain contains the strong alpha emitter

210

210

Pb does not emit alpha particles, its

Po. Therefore packaging impurities should

not be neglected even if packaging techniques improve.
Consequently, all reliable computing devices must be protected by some mitigation
techniques, especially in space. SRAM-based FPGAs are no exception.

1

This chapter introduces the types of radiation-induced SEEs, as well as their effects
on FPGAs and other electronic systems. In addition, it discusses various fault-tolerance
techniques used to mitigate these effects. The last section will introduce several evaluation
criteria and modeling techniques for reliability that will be used in this dissertation.
1

Although the neutron flux at ground level is much less than in space, atmospheric neutrons as well as
impurities in IC packaging are still able to cause upsets [17]. Therefore proper mitigation is also required
for critical devices at ground level.

7

2.1

Single Event Effects
SEEs are induced by high energy particles interacting with electronic components

when the charge liberated by a charged particle becomes greater than the critical charge
of the element [16], [18]. They can cause spikes in current or voltage and result in data
corruption, transient disturbance, and high current conditions.
2.1.1

Types of SEE
SEEs can be divided into two broad categories: soft errors and hard errors. Soft

errors, also called non-destructive errors, do not damage the circuitry and can be recovered
by a reset, a power cycle or a rewrite of the information. Hard errors, also called destructive
errors, are not recoverable and may result in damage to the circuitry [16], [18], [19]. Figure 2.1
illustrates all the categories under SEE [16].

SEE

(Single Event Effect)

Soft Error
SET

(Single Event
Transient)

SBU

SEU

(Single Event
Upset)

(Single Bit Upset)

Hard Error
SEFI

SEL

(Single Event
Functional Interrupt)

(Single Event
Latch-Up)

SEB

(Single Event
Burnout)

SEGR

(Single Event
Gate Rupture)

MBU

(Multiple Bit Upset)

Recoverable Errors

Non-Recoverable Errors

Figure 2.1: Types of Single Event Effects.

Single Event Transient (SET) is a voltage or current spike resulting from a high-energy
particle impacting a combinatorial path of a device. The spike may propagate through the
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circuit given sufficient pulse width. When an SET propagates through the combinational
logic and is captured by a latch or a flip-flop, it can cause an SEU [18].
Single Event Upset (SEU) is a change of state of a memory element (SRAM, flash,
flip-flop, or latch) induced by an energetic particle. SEUs can be categorized as single bit
upsets (SBUs) or multiple bit upsets (MBUs)2 .
Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) is a disruption to normal device operation.
An SEFI can interrupt the normal operation of the circuit and usually requires a power
cycle, a reset, or a reconfiguration to recover [18], [21].
Single Event Latch-Up (SEL) is a condition which causes loss of device functionality
due to a single event induced high current state. An SEL may or may not cause permanent
device damage, but typically requires power cycling to resume normal device operations [19].
Single Event Burnout (SEB) is induced by high-energy ion impacting a transistor
source, and can cause device destruction [22].
Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) is a single ion induced condition in power MOSFETs which may result in the formation of a conducting path in the gate oxide [16].
2.1.2

SEE and ASICs
Soft errors such as SETs and SEUs pose great challenges to the reliability of ASIC

devices. SEUs can change the state of memory cells such as flip-flops (FFs), dynamic random
access memories (DRAMs), and static random access memories (SRAMs) [17], [23]. In
addition, SETs can cause SEUs if the transient voltage or current spikes are latched into a
memory element, and thus can lead to the same problem as SEUs.
Decreased operating voltages and element capacitance, combined with increased clock
speeds, have risen SEU concerns in ASICs [16]. For example, ASIC designs at 40 nm and
2

MBUs compose just a small percentage of all SEUs, but it is getting worse with each generation of Xilinx
Virtex FPGAs [20]. For the sake of simplification, MBUs will not be considered in the context of SEUs in
this dissertation.
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below have been characterized with over 5,000 failures in time (FIT) 3 per million gates, and
over 5,000 FIT per million bits of memory [24]. Most ASICs at 40 nm and below contain
5 to 10 million gates and 10 to 40 million bits of memory. This high density results in
250,000 FIT, or one soft failure per 0.46 years for a single device. Therefore, system-level
consideration and mitigation techniques are necessary for ASICs.
2.1.3

SEE and FPGAs
FPGAs can be categorized into two broad classes based on their configuration mech-

anism, either reconfigurable or one-time programmable [25]. The one-time programmable
devices use antifuses and therefore their configuration circuitry is immune to SEEs. The
reconfigurable devices can be further divided into volatile SRAM-based and non-volatile
with Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) or flash memory.
While all of the three are not immune to SEEs [26], SRAM-based FPGAs are especially
susceptible to radiation-induced upsets because the other two employ non-volatile memories
and can be turned off when not in use (devices are immune to SEEs when powered off).
SRAM-based FPGAs employ two types of memories. The first type is user memory,
which can be subdivided into user RAMs and user flip-flops. User RAMs store user data,
and function the same as their counterparts in ASIC circuits. In Xilinx FPGAs, these memories are called Block RAMs (BRAMs), and are smaller in size and more distributed than
traditional memories. User flip-flops are used to implement sequential logic circuits such
as state machines, counters, registers, synchronizers, etc [6]. The second type of memory,
configuration memory, stores configuration information which controls function, routing, features, I/O drive, etc. in the FPGA. It consists of the “bitstream” which is downloaded into
the FPGA. Changing the contents of the configuration memory can alter the functionality
of a design. Configuration memory usually takes the vast majority of the total memory
bits on an FPGA. For example, in Xilinx Virtex-4, Virtex-5, and Virtex-6 family FPGAs,
configuration memory always counts for more than 80% of the total memory bits [27], [28],
[29], [30], [31], [32]. Since FPGAs have no advantage over ASICs when it comes to user stor3

Failures in Time (FIT) is the number of failures expected in one billion (109 ) device-hours of operation.
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age, the addition of configuration memory would make FPGA designs much more vulnerable
to SEEs than ASICs.
Although SRAM-based FPGAs are susceptible to SEEs, their reconfigurability makes
them more preferred than antifuse FPGAs in many applications. SRAM-based FPGAs also
provide easier and faster reconfiguration compared to EEPROM FPGAs. In addition, flash
FPGAs suffer from total ionizing dose (TID) effects 4 , and their multi-level structures result
in much smaller threshold voltages and therefore may threaten radiation hardness [34]. This
dissertation will focus on SEU effects on SRAM-based FPGAs and mitigation techniques.
2.1.4

SEU Effects in SRAM-based FPGAs
As mentioned above, SEUs can cause errors in configuration memory, user BRAMs,

and user flip-flops of an FPGA. This section will discuss how SEUs would affect these components and the mechanism of the induced faults.
Configuration Memory FPGAs have several SEU-induced failure modes that conventional ASICs circuits do not have because they employ configuration memory [21]. A change
of a configuration bit can alter the function of the configuration logic blocks(CLBs), routing
resources, input/output blocks (IOBs), and other programmable FPGA resources.
An SEU could cause routing errors in multiplexers (MUXes), programmable interconnect points (PIPs), and buffers [21]. If the select bits of a multiplexer are changed, then
a routing error occurs. A PIP is a pass transistor between two wires that can either be on or
off. Thus an error in the configuration bit of a PIP will cause an unwanted open if the two
wires are supposed to be connected, and vice versa. A buffer is a driver which can either
be turned on or off. The failure modes of a buffer are very similar to the PIP failures, but
the difference is that buffers are unidirectional, thus a buffer failure only affects the output.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a few examples of SEU-induced routing errors in FPGAs.
SEUs can also result in logic errors. For example, the Xilinx Virtex family FPGAs
use lookup tables (LUTs) to perform most logic functions, therefore a change in the LUT
4

Total ionizing dose effect is the cumulative damage of the semiconductor lattice caused by ionizing
radiation over the exposition time [33]. It influences a transistor’s threshold voltage, making an N-type
transistor easier to switch on and a P-type transistor more difficult to switch on. The unit of TID is called
a rad.
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Figure 2.2: Examples of Routing Errors Caused by SEUs.

values may alter the implemented function [21]. Figure 2.3 shows an example. Here the
3-input LUT implements a logic function of OR (O=F1+F2+F3), as shown in 2.3(a). If
the first bit in the LUT gets upset and is changed to ‘1’, then the output will always be ‘1’
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no matter what the inputs are (2.3(b)). Thus the logic is changed to constant ‘1’ by SEU.
Besides LUT value errors, SEUs can cause control bit changes in CLBs or IOBs as well.
Inside these blocks, some signals such as clock, clock enable, and reset, can be inverted if the
corresponding control bit is asserted. In addition, LUTs can perform as a LUT, a RAM, or
a shift register depending on its control bits. Should an SEU occur at one of these control
bits, logic errors will likely result.

3-input LUT

3-input LUT
SEU

1

0

F1

F1

1

1

1

F2

1

F2

O

1

O

1

1

F3

1

1

F3

1

1

1

1

1

Logic: O=F1+F2+F3

Logic: O=1 (constant one)

(a) Original Values in a LUT

(b) SEU-induced Error in a LUT

Figure 2.3: An Example of Logic Error Caused by SEUs.

User Memory User memory includes user flip-flops and user BRAMs. These memories
can affect the correctness of the result in that they store large amounts of information such as
data and controller state. Similar to configuration memory, user memory is also susceptible
to radiation-induced SEUs. The failure mode of user memory is fairly simple, being that the
content of a memory cell can be flipped by an SEU (‘0’ → ‘1’ or ‘1’ → ‘0’). Upsets in user
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flip-flops and user BRAMs can introduce bad data into a circuit as well as lead to errors in
a controlling circuit such as a state machine [21].
2.2

Fault-Tolerance Techniques for SRAM-Based FPGAs
As discussed in Section 2.1, SRAM-based FPGAs are especially susceptible to SEUs

and therefore require mitigation techniques. Mitigation techniques can be divided into three
broad categories: fault-avoidance techniques, fault-detection techniques, and fault-tolerance
techniques [12].
The fault-avoidance approach is to increase system reliability by reducing the possibility of failures. This involves manipulating factors that affect the failure rate, such as
quality factor (a parameter used to describe the quality of components), temperature factor
(a function of junction temperature), environment factor (a parameter specified for general
classes of environmental conditions), etc [12]. Fault-detection techniques rely on redundancy
— that is, extra information or resources beyond those required by normal operation [12].
For example, duplication can be implemented by employing two identical copies of a design.
Assuming only one error is present at any given moment, the fault can be detected by comparing the two copies. Unlike fault-detection techniques, fault-tolerance techniques can not
only detect faults, but also tolerate the faults by masking or correcting them.
In this section, several types of fault-tolerance techniques will be introduced. In real
designs, two or more techniques are often applied simultaneously to provide a more reliable
circuit.
2.2.1

Redundancy
Redundancy can provide fault tolerance by either isolating or correcting the effects of

faults before they reach module outputs [12]. There are three types of redundancy: spatial
redundancy, temporal redundancy, and information redundancy [2].
Spatial Redundancy uses redundancy in space to mask errors. In N -Modular Redundancy (NMR), N copies of the functional circuit as well as a majority voter are employed to
provide fault tolerance [12]. Normally N is an odd number to avoid the situation where the
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output vote is a tie. The area cost of NMR is N times the original circuit plus the voting
logic. Triple modular redundancy (TMR), a special case of NMR, will be discussed in more
detail in Subsection 2.2.2.
Temporal Redundancy uses redundancy in time. A computation is repeated on the
same hardware multiple times to determine the correct output [35]. However, repeating the
exact same computation on the same hardware can only correct transient errors because
SEU-induced permanent faults will affect all computations in the same way. To solve this
problem, some temporal redundancy designs have been proposed to correct both permanent
and transient faults [36], [37]. Temporal redundancy uses fewer resources but takes more
clock cycles than TMR.
Information Redundancy uses more bits than required to store or transmit data, and
the extra bits are able to help detect and/or correct errors when they occur. Information
redundancy is often used to correct data in BRAMs or encodings in finite state machines
(FSMs) [2], [35]. Error correcting codes (ECCs) are a widely used technique and will be
discussed in more detail in Subsection 2.2.3.
2.2.2

Triple Modular Redundancy
TMR is a popular fault-tolerance technique to mitigate the effects of SEUs in the

FPGA configuration memory. The concept of TMR was first proposed by Jon von Neumann
in 1956 [38]. Using TMR, three copies of the same circuit are created with the purpose of
masking out a single failure in any one of the three copies. This masking is accomplished by
means of a majority (two-out-of-three) voter on the circuit outputs [12]. Figure 2.4 shows
a block diagram of a simple TMR circuit, which requires triplication of the protected logic
and addition of voting logic. Therefore the area cost of simple TMR is more than 3X.
The problem with simple TMR, however, is that the voter itself is also sensitive
to configuration upsets. To reduce the configuration sensitivity

5

of simple TMR, other

improved reliable TMR methods have been developed. Figure 2.5(a) shows a TMR design
5

Configuration sensitivity is a metric to measure design reliability. It is measured by the number of
configuration bits within the device that, when upset, may affect the behavior of the circuit [35].
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Copy C
Figure 2.4: A Simple TMR Circuit.

with triplicated voters [12], [6]. The three voters can mask out SEUs at the voting logic and
can be applied to forward-feeding circuits. For FSMs and other structures with feedback
paths, another TMR design [6] is shown by Figure 2.5(b). TMR with feedback can help the
problematic circuit to restore the correct value by loading the voter output. The improved
TMR designs shown in Figure 2.5 can significantly reduce the configuration sensitivity, but
are also very costly in terms of resources. If the original circuit is about the same size as the
voter, then the overhead in area can be as high as 6X. It has been shown that TMR with
triplicated voters is the most cost-effective reliability technique for protecting configuration
memory compared to other methods [6].
Although TMR can effectively reduce the configuration sensitivity, it cannot correct
errors but only mask them. It is inevitable that upsets will build up in the configuration
memory over time and eventually defeat the redundancy of TMR. Figure 2.6 shows such
a case, where the reliability (probability of correct operation at time t) of an unprotected
module and its TMR version is compared against each other. As we can see from the figure,
the TMR circuit has a higher reliability at the beginning, because of its lower configuration
sensitivity. Once the system has exhausted its redundancy, however, its reliability will fall
below the non-redundant circuit. This is because there are simply more components in the
TMR circuit to fail. Thus, it is crucial to employ some repair processes, such as scrubbing,
along with TMR to prevent upsets from accumulating in the system. Subsection 2.2.4 will
introduce scrubbing in more detail.
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Figure 2.5: Improved TMR Designs.

2.2.3

Error Correcting Codes
Error correcting codes (ECCs) are a widely used masking technique for user memories.

For user BRAMs, Hamming single error correction/double error detection (SEC/DED) codes
are the most commonly used because they are inexpensive in terms of both area cost and
performance overhead [12]. SEC/DED codes can detect any single-bit error in a memory
word and correct it immediately, as well as detect but not correct double-bit errors. For k
data bits, an (n, k) Hamming code requires c additional check bits, where 2c ≥ c + k + 1 [12].
Some common combinations of c, k, and n are listed in Table 2.1. The values of k and n
shown in the table are upper bounds.
The following example shows how SEC/DED codes work. Figure 2.7(a) shows the
parity-check matrix of an (8,4) Hamming SEC/DED code. Each word has four data bits
and four check bits. The received word r is decoded by performing a dot product with the
parity-check matrix, using modulo-2 addition. The resulting c-bit column vector is called the
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Figure 2.6: Reliability of Non-redundant and TMR Modules.

Table 2.1: SEC/DED Code Size

c (Check bits) k (Data bits)
2
1
3
4
4
11
5
26
6
57

n (Total bits)
3
7
15
31
63

syndrome. If the syndrome is all-zero, then the received word is correct (Figure 2.7(b)). If
the received word has a single error, then the syndrome will match the column in the paritycheck matrix corresponding to the upset bit (Figure 2.7(c)). If double errors occur, then the
syndrome will be different from all columns in the parity-check matrix (Figure 2.7(d)).
SEC/DED codes can only correct the error bit at the output but not correct it in the
BRAM word. Thus for large memory systems, SEC/DED codes need to be used along with
scrubbing to provide satisfactory reliability.
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Figure 2.7: An Example of Hamming SEC/DED Codes.
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2.2.4

Scrubbing
As mentioned above, redundancy techniques such as TMR and SEC/DED codes are

able to mask errors but not correct them. Both TMR and SEC/DED codes are designed to
mitigate a single error, but as errors accumulate in the system, they will eventually defeat
the redundancy. However, another technique called scrubbing, is able to correct errors in
the circuit by overwriting the erroneous data with the correct data. Thus, scrubbing is often
applied along with TMR and SEC/DED codes to prevent multiple errors from accumulating
in the circuit. Scrubbing can work for both configuration and user memory, but in different
ways.
Configuration memory scrubbing Configuration memory scrubbing uses on-line reconfiguration to reload the configuration bitstream of an FPGA while the circuit is running [21].
The configuration memory array of an FPGA contains two types of information: configuration information of the implemented design, and initialization information for BRAMs [39].
Scrubbing for BRAMs is different than scrubbing for configuration bitstreams and will be
discussed in the next section. CLB frames contain configuration information for all programmable elements in the FPGA, including LUTs, CLBs, IOBs, BRAM control signals,
and routing. A CLB frame is the smallest unit of the configuration memory that can be
read from or written to.
Bitstream scrubbing used to refer to a “blind” mechanism which simply reloads the
entire CLB configuration periodically. Since partial configuration became available [35],
scrubbing can be performed only when an error is detected. An operation called “readback”
and cyclic redundancy check (CRC) are used to detect the existence of errors in any CLB
frame. If a frame’s CRC value obtained from readback does not match its pre-calculated
“golden” value, then the frame is scrubbed (reloaded) to remove the SEU.
Configuration memory contains some dynamic configuration bits, meaning that they
may change during operation [40]. These bits include the content of LUT RAMs, 16-bit
SRLs, and BRAMs. Configuration memory scrubbing should not be applied to protect the
dynamic bits because of the difficulty to predict the value of the changing bits. However,
other techniques such as TMR and SEC/DED codes can be used for LUT RAMs and SRLs.
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BRAMs can be protected by user memory scrubbing. This dissertation focuses on the
methods and characteristics of BRAM scrubbing.
User memory scrubbing BRAMs cannot employ the same scrubbing mechanism as configuration memory because BRAM memory contents may change over time and no “golden”
value can be calculated in advance to compare against. Therefore SEC/DED codes are often
used to provide the correct value should an error occur. Based on the interval between two
scrubs, scrubbing for BRAMs can be divided into two categories: deterministic scrubbing
and probabilistic scrubbing [10] [7].
During deterministic scrubbing, each word of the memory is regularly read and
checked for correctness. If a single-bit error is detected, it is corrected by SEC/DED codes
and written back to the memory. Deterministic scrubbing is implemented by a memory
scrubbing module, or a scrubber, which goes through all memory locations at a fixed rate.
The fixed scrub rate leads to a uniform distribution of scrubbing events over time. An appropriate scrub rate can effectively prevent a memory from gathering a second error and
therefore considerably improves the memory’s reliability.
Figure 2.8 shows a block diagram of a scrubber and its connection to a memory. The
scrubber interfaces to a Xilinx Virtex-5 RAMB36 primitive, which has 1024 words and 36
bits for each word. The RAMB36 primitive has two ports, port A and port B, which are
independent to each other. The scrubber reads from and writes to the memory through port
B, and port A is used for normal memory operations.
The scrubber employs a counter to go through all the memory locations. A second
counter is used by the scrubber to wait for enough clock cycles before each scrubbing. The
depth of the memory as well as the scrubbing interval can be set as VHDL generic values.
To avoid conflicts with normal memory operations, a state machines is built to control the
behavior of the scrubber. If a memory address is written through port A and read through
port B simultaneously, then the read operation on port B will be held until the write operation
on port A completes. Similarly, if a memory address is written through port B and accessed
(read or written) through port A simultaneously, the write operation on port B will be held
until the operation on port A completes.
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Figure 2.8: A Block Diagram of a Scrubber and Its Connection to a Memory.

The scrubber shown in Figure 2.8 was coded using VHDL and implemented using
Xilinx ISE. The implementing summary showed that the scrubber occupied 13 slices and
had a maximum frequency of 403.779 MHz. These numbers may change as the memory
depth or the scrubbing interval change. The VHDL code of this example design is presented
in Appendix A.
With probabilistic scrubbing, whenever a word is accessed by the circuit using the
BRAM, the data is checked and corrected. Probabilistic scrubbing can be done any time
a word is read, written, or both. For example, with probabilistic read scrubbing, the word
would be read and, if an error was detected by the SEC/DED circuitry, another memory cycle
would be used to write the corrected value back to memory. This obviously has performance
ramifications by requiring additional memory write cycles from time to time, something that
may interfere with normal circuit operation. However, on all memory write operations, new
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(and therefore correct) data is written into the memory. Hence write operations can be seen
as a kind of probabilistic write scrubbing which requires no extra circuitry or clock cycles —
that is, it has no area or performance overhead.
For probabilistic scrubbing, the scrubbing events occur continuously and independently. Therefore, their occurrences in a fixed interval of time can be expressed by the
Poisson distribution [41]:
f (k; λ) =

λk e−λ
,
k!

(2.1)

where λ is the expected count of events during the time interval, and f (k; λ) is the probability
that the count is exactly k. The scrub rate will be denoted as µ in this dissertation, and the
scrub interval distributes exponentially with a rate of 1/µ.
This dissertation will investigate and propose mathematical models to estimate the
reliability of SEC/DED memories with scrubbing in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
2.2.5

Radiation Hardening by Design
Radiation Hardening By Design (RHBD) is a radiation hardening method imple-

mented by modifying the electronic components or the layout of the design to improve their
immunity to SEUs. In addition, RHBD is usually based on some form of storage redundancy and upset recovery [42]. For example, RHBD designs for flip-flops [43], SRAMs, and
combinational logic have been proposed and discussed [42].
Over the recent years, Xilinx has released several defense/space-grade FPGAs that
meet the requirements of military or space applications: Virtex-4QV [44], Virtex-5QV [45],
and Virtex-6Q [46]. Virtex-5QV is so far the only FPGA built with RHBD technology, and is
also called the Single-Event Immune Reconfigurable FPGA (SIRF). With RHBD, the SIRF
FPGA is able to provide intrinsic hardness from SEU and SET to part of the device [45].
This includes protection over configuration memory, JTAG control logic, CLBs, IOBs, etc.
Other parts of the FPGA, including BRAMs, are not radiation hardened by design. Because
of the inherent SEU sensitivity of BRAMs, they are protected by built-in ECC.
RHBD technology provides significant reliability improvement to the SIRF. For example, the RHBD latches used for the configuration memory in SIRF have nearly 1,000
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times the SEU hardness of the standard cell latches in the commercial counterpart [30]. In
addition, the SIRF has a guaranteed 700 krad total ionizing dose, compared to 300 krad of
Virtex-4QV, a radiation-tolerant FPGA [44], [45].
2.3

Reliability Evaluation Techniques
In this section, evaluation criteria and modeling techniques for reliability will be

introduced.
2.3.1

Evaluation Criteria for Reliability
In a broad sense of the word, reliability describes how reliable a system is — that is,

how long the system can work without a failure. For example, if a spacecraft successfully
completes its mission, then its components can be considered as reliable. However, this
definition of reliability is vague and weak. In this subsection, several evaluation criteria are
introduced for scientific measurement of reliability. These evaluation criteria can be used to
compare the fault-tolerance techniques discussed in the previous subsection as well as make
designers aware of the reliability of their circuits.
Reliability In a narrow sense of the word, reliability, denoted as R(t), is defined as the
probability that a system works correctly from time 0 to t, given that the system operates
correctly at time 0 [12]. Failure rate, denoted as λ, is the frequency with which failures will
occur. For electronic components, the failure rate can be depicted by the “bathtub” curve
shown in Figure 2.9 [12]. The failure rate is high during the “infant mortality period” due
to manufacturing defects, and decreases as time passes by. Then the failure rate tends to
stabilize to a constant value for a long time, and this period is called “normal lifetime”.
Eventually the components begin to wear out and the failure rate rises during the “wear-out
period”. In this dissertation, the reliability study is focused on the normal lifetime period,
where the λ can be considered as a constant rate.
The failures of electronic components are often assumed to follow the Poisson distribution in that they occur continuously and independently. Given a component whose failure
rate is λ and a time interval [0, t], we can obtain the probability that no failure occurs during
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the interval, or R(t), by Equation 2.1:
R(t) = f (0; λt) =

(λt)0 e−λt
0!

Failure rate

= e−λt .

(2.2)

Normal lifetime

Infant
mortality
period

Wear-out
period

~20 weeks

5 – 25 years
Time

Figure 2.9: Bathtub-shaped Curve of Failure Rate.

Availability Availability, denoted as A(t), is an evaluation criteria for systems with repair
process. It is defined as the probability that the system is operational at any given time [12].
Assuming a constant failure rate λ and a constant repair rate µ, the availability can be
derived as follows:

6

A(t) =

µ
λ −(λ+µ)t
+
e
.
λ+µ λ+µ

As t → ∞, A(t) approaches its steady-state availability, Ass =

(2.3)
µ
.
λ+µ

Availability differs from reliability in that the former is for systems with repair process
and the latter is for systems without repair process. Therefore A(t) is the probability that
the system works at time instant t. Before t, any number of failures could have occurred.
6

The derivation of the availability function is not shown here because it involves solving a Markov
model [12] which is complex. Markov models will be introduced in the next subsection.
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Scrubbing is a typical example of repair process that can be used in a system. Thus when we
deal with SEC/DED memories with scrubbing, it is the availability that we study. However,
the word “reliability” is often used instead of “availability” as a customary usage when there
is no confusion. In this dissertation, the word “reliability” will be used as convention does.
Mean time to failure Mean time to failure (MTTF) is the expected time of the first
failure in a number of identical systems, given all systems are functional at time 0 [12].
MTTF can be calculated by taking the integral of the reliability function over time:
Z

∞

MT T F =

R(t)dt.

(2.4)

0

For a system with a constant failure rate λ, its MTTF can be easily obtained by Equation 2.2
and Equation 2.4:
MT T F =

1
.
λ

Configuration sensitivity Configuration sensitivity is an FPGA-specific measurement
for reliability which reveals the SEU susceptibility of FPGA designs [2]. As previously
mentioned, SEUs can cause errors in the configuration memory and alter the hardware implemented on an FPGA. Sensitive bits are those bits in the configuration memory that, when
upset, cause the output of the design to change. Configuration sensitivity is a measurement
of the number of sensitive bits in a design. Typically, a design uses only a part of the entire
set of configuration bits. For an unprotected design, the set of sensitive bits is the same as
the set of utilized bits. For a mitigated design, most (usually more than 90%) utilized bits
are immune to SEUs and are insensitive [2].
Configuration sensitivity of a design can be investigated by a method called fault
injection testing [47]. The purpose of fault injection testing is to simulate the effects of
SEUs on a design. During fault injection, two FPGAs implementing the same design are
used. One FPGA is error-free and called the golden design, and the other one is called
design under test (DUT), containing the design being tested. A fault is injected into the
configuration bitstream of the DUT by toggling a bit in the configuration memory. The two
FPGAs receive identical inputs and their outputs are compared after a fault is injected. If
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the outputs of the DUT differ from the golden design, then the toggled configuration bit
will be marked as a sensitive bit. This procedure repeats for each bit in the configuration
bitstream to discover the sensitivity of the design.
Fault injection is used to test some synchronizer designs proposed by this dissertation.
More details of the experimental setup will be described in Chapter 4.
2.3.2

Modeling Techniques for Reliability
Mathematical models play an important role in the evaluation of reliability. Differ-

ent reliability models are required to correctly characterize the behaviors of different faulttolerance techniques. In this subsection, several basic modeling techniques related to the
topics of this dissertation will be discussed.
Series models A common case in reliability evaluation is that a system is composed of
multiple independent components, all of which must operate for the system to function
correctly. A series model can be used to characterize such a system (Figure 2.10).

R1(t)

R2(t)

Rn-1(t)

…

Rn(t)

Figure 2.10: A Series Model for Reliability Evaluation.

If we assume that each component is independent and has a constant failure rate
λi , and the reliability of component i is denoted as Ri (t), then the overall reliability of the
system is
Rsys (t) =

n
Y
i=1

Ri (t) =

n
Y

e

−λi t

n
X
= exp(−(
λi )t).

i=1

(2.5)

i=1

This indicates that the system also has a constant failure rate which is the sum of the failure
rate of each individual component. In addition, the MTTF of such a system is
1
M T T F = Pn

i=1
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λi

.

(2.6)

M-of-N models M -of-N models require M out of the total N components to operate for
the system to be functional. A special case of M -of-N models is TMR circuits, which require
at least two modules to function. The reliability of a module is denoted as Rm and therefore
RT M R =

3
Rm

 
3 2
+
R (1 − Rm ).
2 m

(2.7)

Markov models Markov models, named after the Russian mathematician Andrei Markov,
are a powerful tool for modeling systems composed of several processes [12], [48], [49]. State
and state transition are two basic concepts of Markov models. Take a simple module with
two states as an example. It has a functional state and a failed state. The module transitions
from the functional state to the failed state at its failure rate, and this change of state is
called state transition.
An important assumption of Markov models is that the probability of a given state
transition depends only on the current state [12]. This means that the time spent in a
state does not affect the remaining time in the same state before the next transition. This
characteristic fits naturally with the assumption that failures and repairs occur following the
Poisson distribution.
Figure 2.11(a) shows the differential Markov model for a module with a failure process
and a repair process. We assume that state 0 represents the functional state and state 1
represents the failed state, and its failure rate λ and µ are constants. The state transition
probabilities in a time interval ∆t are labeled on the corresponding directed arcs pointing
from one state to the next state.
The differential Markov model shown by Figure 2.11(a) can be mathematically expressed by a transition matrix P, where entry Pij represents the probability of a transition
from state i to state j:

P=

1 − λ∆t

λ∆t

µ∆t

1 − µ∆t
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.

λ

λΔt
1-μΔt

1-λΔt

0

0

1

1

μΔt

μ

(a) A Two-State Differential Markov Model

(b) A Two-State
Markov Model

Continuous

Figure 2.11: An Example of Markov Models.

Then the probability of being in state 0 or 1 at time t + ∆t can be expressed by multiplying
the probability at time t by the transition matrix:

[p0 (t + ∆t), p1 (t + ∆t)] = [p0 (t), p1 (t)] 

1 − λ∆t

λ∆t

µ∆t

1 − µ∆t


.

The matrix multiplication gives
p0 (t + ∆t) = (1 − λ∆t)p0 (t) + µ∆tp1 (t),
p1 (t + ∆t) = λ∆tp0 (t) + (1 − µ∆t)p1 (t).
Rearranging and dividing by ∆t on both sides gives
p0 (t + ∆t) − p0 (t)
= −λp0 (t) + µp1 (t),
∆t
p1 (t + ∆t) − p1 (t)
= λp0 (t) − µp1 (t).
∆t
Taking the limit as ∆t approaches zero generates a set of simultaneous differential equations
(the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations) [12]:
dp0 (t)
= ṗ0 (t) = −λp0 (t) + µp1 (t),
dt
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dp1 (t)
= ṗ1 (t) = λp0 (t) − µp1 (t).
dt
Or in matrix form,

[ṗ0 (t), ṗ1 (t)] = [p0 (t), p1 (t)] 

−λ

λ

µ

−µ


.

This change of state can be characterized by the continuous Markov model shown in Figure
2.11(b).
The reliability of this module, R(t), equals the probability that the module is in state
0 at time t, or,
R(t) = p0 (t).
In this dissertation, two models will be built for SEC/DED memories with scrubbing using
Markov models. The solving process for R(t) will be given in detail in Chapter 6.
2.4

Summary
Radiation-induced SEUs in space environment can affect electronic devices including

SRAM-based FPGAs. SRAM-based FPGAs are susceptible to SEUs because they employ
volatile memory for configuration data and user data storage. The configuration memory
contains implementation information of the design such as logic functions and routing. Thus
an SEU in the configuration bitstream can alter the hardware implemented in the FPGA
and cause circuit malfunction. SEUs in the user memory will result in corrupted data which
can deviate the design from correct operation.
Various fault-tolerance techniques, such as TMR, SEC/DED codes, and scrubbing,
can be utilized to mitigate the effects of SEUs. TMR has been proved to provide the
best protection in terms of configuration sensitivity. In addition, reliability evaluation is a
fundamental problem in the study of reliability. Different modeling methods can be used to
compare different mitigation techniques and make trade-off decisions.
This dissertation has two focuses. First, it will investigate the correctness and reliability of synchronizers with TMR. This problem is presented in Chapter 3. Second, reliability
models for SEC/DED memories with scrubbing will be reviewed and new models that are
suitable for FPGA applications will be proposed and derived.
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Chapter 3
Issues of TMR Circuits with Clock Domain Crossing
In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that TMR is a common and effective mitigation
technique for FPGA circuits. Although TMR works well for circuits that have only one
single clock domain, it may cause problems when applied to circuits that have multiple
asynchronous clock domains (as shown in Figure 3.1). The redundancy introduced by TMR
can lead to synchronization problems, which is named as asynchronous sampling uncertainty
in [13], among the three copies of the circuit and therefore pose challenges to reliable data
communication when the TMR circuit crosses asynchronous clock domains.

TMR
Circuit

Copy A

Copy A

Voter

Output A

Copy B

Copy B

Voter

Output B

Copy C

Copy C

Voter

Output C

Sender’s domain

TMR
Circuit

Receiver’s domain

Figure 3.1: A TMR Circuit Crossing Clock Domains.

The functional correctness of an FPGA-based TMR circuit which crosses clock domains may be threatened by three different problems: 1) meta-stability, 2) asynchronous
sampling uncertainty, and 3) SEUs. This chapter will analyze and quantify each of these
problems, as well as demonstrate the effects of asynchronous sampling uncertainty with
regard to triplicated clock domain crossings.
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3.1

Meta-stability
Meta-stability is a well-known issue that may cause system failures in digital systems

where signals are transmitted across asynchronous clock boundaries [50]. Meta-stability is
also a problem within FPGA circuits that incorporate multiple clock domains [51]. Note
that meta-stability is not a unique problem of TMR, but a generic issue of all circuits that
involve clock domain crossing. A flip-flop may enter a meta-stable state when its setup or
hold times are violated. Once the flip-flop enters meta-stability, it will stay there for an
indeterminate period of time and eventually resolve to a stable state (could be either ‘0’
or ‘1’) [52]. In meta-stability, the output of the flip-flop will oscillate around the middle
point between the power supply voltage and the ground voltage, resulting in unstable digital
values. When other gates and flip-flops are presented with a meta-stable input signal, some
may interpret it as a ‘0’ and others as a ‘1’, leading to inconsistent behavior. Or the other
gates and flip-flops may produce meta-stable outputs themselves [53].
A special synchronizer circuit is used to reduce the frequency of meta-stability when
signals come from other asynchronous clock domains. In one example, two or more flip-flops
are placed in series to synchronize the incoming asynchronous signal to the clock domain
(see Figure 3.2). Since the input signal is asynchronous, the first flip-flop (FF1) may enter
a meta-stable state if the signal undergoes a transition within its setup/hold time window.
Although FF1 may enter a meta-stable state, FF2 will not sample FF1 for another clock
period. The additional clock period usually provides time for FF1 to resolve to a stable state.
However, if FF1 does not return to a stable state before FF2 samples its output, then an
unknown output may propagate to other part of the circuit. A variety of additional circuits
beyond the circuit of Figure 3.2 have been proposed to address this problem under many
different circumstances [54].
An equation for estimating the MTTF of such a flip-flop based synchronizer is given
by [55]:
MT T F =

eK2 Tr
.
K1 F 1 F 2

(3.1)

In Equation 3.1, Tr is the resolution time or the time given to the synchronizer to resolve
to a stable state once it enters meta-stability. F1 is the clock frequency of the synchronizer
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Asynchronous input
FF1

FF2

clock
Figure 3.2: Synchronizers Between the Two Clock Domains.

and F2 is the data frequency or the frequency at which the input signal changes. K1 is the
meta-stability catching window, which represents the likelihood of entering meta-stability.
K2 is a constant related to the flip-flop’s ability to resolve intermediate voltage level [56].
Both K1 and K2 are constants that depend on the characteristics of a specific device. Using
data from [55] [57], K2 for a flip-flop in Xilinx Virtex-4 devices can be calculated as 24.30/ns.
If we assume that the flip-flop’s setup time plus the wire’s propagation delay is 500ps, then
K1 can be calculated as 8.74us. For the synchronizer shown in Figure 3.2, let us assume
F1 = 200MHz and F2 = 100MHz. Tr is a clock period minus FF2’s setup time and the
propagation delay of the wire, therefore Tr =4.5ns. Using these values and Equation 3.1, the
MTTF of the synchronizer is 5.61×1028 years. As will be shown later in this dissertation, this
is many orders of magnitude longer than the MTTF of the other parts of a clock crossing
circuit. Thus, in the remainder of this dissertation we will not further deal with metastability under the specific assumption that meta-stability synchronizers are always used in
circuits to deal with this particular problem.
3.2

Sampling Uncertainty
When applying TMR to a circuit, each component and signal in the circuit is trip-

licated. Using three copies of a synchronizer to represent the same signal introduces a new
problem – asynchronous sampling uncertainty. When three identical signals are sampled
asynchronously, they may arrive in the receiving clock domain on different clock cycles. Figure 3.3(a) illustrates a circuit where a triplicated signal sendSig crosses a clock boundary.
Ideally, the three copies of the received signal, rcvSig A, rcvSig B, and rcvSig C, will be
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identical in the receiving clock domain. However, Figure 3.3(b) demonstrates the problem
caused by asynchronous sampling uncertainty: the sampled signals may not be identical in
the receiving domain due to differences in wire delays and the random nature of sampling
asynchronous signals. Note that the width of sendSig is assumed to be longer than the clock
period of rcvClk. Otherwise, sendSig can not be guaranteed to be caught by the rising edge
of rcvClk. This assumption will hold in this chapter.

Module A
sendSig

Module B
Module C
Sender’s
domain

delayA
delayB
delayC

Module A
Module B
Module C

rcvSig_A
rcvSig_B
rcvSig_C

Receiver’s
domain

(a) A Signal Sent Across Clock Domains.

sendSig
rcvClk
rcvSig_A
rcvSig_B
rcvSig_C
disagreement

disagreement

(b) Disagreements May Occur in the Received Signals Due to Sampling Uncertainty.

Figure 3.3: Clock Domain Crossing with TMR and Sampling Uncertainty.

3.2.1

Mathematical Model of Sampling Uncertainty
To estimate the reliability of a triplicated synchronizer like the one shown in Figure

3.3(a), a model is needed to estimate the probability of sampling uncertainty. This section
will introduce such a model and validate it with a hardware test.
34

The model presented in this section is based on the circuit depicted by Figure 3.4
where signal d is sent from the clks domain and received in the clkr domain. Signal d
is synchronous to clks because it is generated in the sender’s domain, while clks and clkr
are unsynchronized to each other. Signal d is triplicated into three identical signals and
transported over a wiring network with the following delays: delayA , delayB , delayC . In
addition, we make the assumptions that Thold and Tsetup of flip-flops are 0 (meta-stability of
flip-flops is ignored for this analysis).

d

delayA

delayB

delayC

dA

dB

dC

clkr

clks
Figure 3.4: The Circuit Used for Modeling.

Figure 3.5 shows the timing analysis of the sampling uncertainty. When signal d is
sent from the sender’s domain, its three copies, dA , dB , and dC , may arrive at the receiver’s
domain at different instants due to the varying wire delays on different paths. As shown
in Figure 3.5, signals dA and dB arrive before the rising edge of clkr and thus are going to
be caught by the flip-flops in the receiver’s domain. Signal dC , however, falls behind the
rising edge of clkr , and is going to miss this coming clock cycle. In this situation, a sampling
uncertainty event occurs.
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critical window
clks
clkr
d
dA
dB
dC
delayA
delayB
delayC
Figure 3.5: Timing Analysis of the Sampling Problem.

It is clear that if the rising edge of clkr falls outside of the window bounded by
the minimum delay and the maximum delay (delayC − delayA in Figure 3.5), sampling
uncertainty will not happen. In the following model, we use delaymax and delaymin to
denote the maximum and the minimum delay of the three signal wires. In addition, fs is the
clock frequency of the sender’s domain, fr is the clock frequency of the receiver’s domain,
Ts is the clock period of the sender’s domain, and fd is the changing frequency of signal d.
The possibility of a disagreement can be broken into three independent probabilities.
First, assume the clock of the receiver’s domain is slower than that of the sender’s domain.
In this case, a rising edge of the receiver clock will not always fall within a sender clock cycle.
The probability that clkr has a rising edge within a clks cycle is
p1 =

36

fr
.
fs

(3.2)

Second, if clkr has a rising edge in a clks cycle, the probability that it falls into the
critical window is computed by dividing the length of the critical window by the period of
the sender clock, or
p2 =

delaymax − delaymin
.
Ts

(3.3)

The probability that three pulses sent from the sender are not synchronously received at the
receiver is
P1 =p1 · p2
=

fr delaymax − delaymin
·
fs
Ts

=fr · (delaymax − delaymin ).

(3.4)

Finally, the probability that the input signal changes within this clks cycle can be
expressed as

fd
.
fs

Thus the probability that the outputs of the three flip-flops are not all

sampled in the same clock cycle is derived as
P =P1 ·

fd
fs

=fr · (delaymax − delaymin ) ·
=(delaymax − delaymin ) ·

fd
fs

fr fd
.
fs

(3.5)

Multiplying P by the clock frequency of the sender’s domain, we obtain the number
of disagreements per second:
#disagreement/second = (delaymax − delaymin ) · fr · fd .
3.2.2

(3.6)

Validation of the Model for Sampling Uncertainty
To verify the correctness of the mathematical model, we built the circuit of Figure 3.6

in a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA. A data signal d was generated and registered in the sender’s
domain, and then sent to the receiver’s domain through three wires with different delays:
delayA , delayB , and delayC . The three copies of d (dA , dB , and dC ) were registered by three
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flip-flops in the receiver’s domain, and the outputs of the flip-flops (qA , qB , and qC ) were
detected by a disagreement detector. The disagreement detector outputs a ‘0’ when all of
the three signals are the same, and outputs a ‘1’ otherwise. The counter counts how many
times disagreements occurred. The counter value was displayed by a seven segment display
on the FPGA development board.

d

DelayA

DelayB

DelayC

clks

dA

qA

dB

qB

dC

Disagreement
Detector

Counter

Seven Segment
Display

qC

clkr

Figure 3.6: Circuit Used for Model Validation.

We carried out two experiments: the first one was performed on an automatically
routed FPGA circuit, and the second one on a manually re-routed circuit. By manually
routing, we could minimize the difference in the wire delays as much as possible.
In the first experiment, fs and fd were both 100MHz. fr ranged from 20MHz to
50MHz. The other parameter we need for Equation 3.6 is delaymax − delaymin . Because
the wire delays reported by the Xilinx FPGA Editor tool are not accurate enough, a simple
experiment was conducted first to measure this value.
The circuit of Figure 3.6 was implemented with clks and clkr being equal. The phase
difference between the two clock signals is adjustable using the Xilinx Digital Clock Manager
(DCM) [58]. From the analysis of Figure 3.5, we know that when the phase shift of clkr with
respect to clks falls into the interval (delaymin , delaymax ), sampling uncertainty will occur.
By running the circuit with various phase shift parameters, we got that delaymax − delaymin
in the first experiment was approximately 0.469ns.

38

Table 3.1 shows the results obtained by the first experiment, the automatically routed
circuit. Column 1, fr , is the receiver’s clock frequency. Column 2, fd , is the frequency of
data transition. Column 3 is the measured delay difference. Column 4, “Disagreements
calculated (/s)” is the number of disagreements per second calculated using Equation 3.6.
The last column, “Disagreements observed (/s)” gives the number of disagreements per
second exhibited by the seven segment display on the circuit. From Table 3.1 we note that
the calculated and observed number of disagreements are very close, with a difference of 4%
to 6%. This result validates the correctness of Equation 3.6.

Table 3.1: Automatic Routing Experimental Results

fr
fd
delaymax − delaymin
(MHz) (MHz)
(ns)
50
100
0.469
40
100
0.469
30
100
0.469
20
100
0.469

Disagreements
calculated (/s)
2,345,000
1,876,000
1,407,000
938,000

Disagreements Difference
observed (/s)
2,222,979
5.49%
1,792,931
4.63%
1,325,806
6.12%
891,496
5.22%

A second experiment was then performed to reduce the size of the critical window by
manually routing the problematic wires (dA , dB , and dC in Figure 3.6). The three sensitive
wires were routed in such a way that they have the same delay within the Xilinx FPGA
Editor tool. The same approach of the first experiment was taken to measure the actual
value of delaymax − delaymin , but it was impossible to obtain an accurate result because it
was less than the minimum resolution of the DCM’s phase shift function [58], which was
78ps. Table 3.2 shows the experimental results after manually routing the wires.

Table 3.2: Manually Routing Experimental Results

fr
(MHz)
50
40
30
20

fd
delaymax − delaymin
(MHz)
(ns)
100
< 0.078
100
< 0.078
100
< 0.078
100
< 0.078
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Disagreements
calculated (/s)
< 390, 000
< 312, 000
< 234, 000
< 156, 000

Disagreements
observed (/s)
160,134
133,336
97,331
67,955

The number of disagreements per second decreases by a factor of 10 when the three
sensitive wires are manually routed. Although FPGA Editor shows that all the three wires
have the same delay (delaymax − delaymin = 0ns), disagreements are not completely eliminated. This is because the three wires are not perfectly matched in the actual silicon of the
device. Additionally, sampling error is not only a result of wire delay — even if the three
legs have exactly the same delays, set up time and hold time violations are unavoidable due
to the asynchronous sampling being performed, and the outcome of setup and hold time
violations is unpredictable.
The results of the experiments show that asynchronous sampling uncertainty can
not be eliminated. Especially in FPGA circuits that are automatically routed, sampling
uncertainty is inevitable. In the sections which follow, the presence of sampling uncertainty
will play a role in the design of a number of synchronizers. This sampling uncertainty effect
will only be exacerbated by unequal arrival times of the three signals at the sampling flipflop inputs. In the following sections we will call this difference in arrival times (delaymax −
delaymin ) the signal skew. Synchronizers used in a TMR environment must be developed
with this in mind.
3.3

TMR, Sampling Uncertainty, and Signal Skew
Consider the circuit of Figure 3.7, where three copies of a single pulse have been

transmitted across the circuit, from the domain of Clksnd to the domain of Clkrcv . Due to
differences in the delays imposed by interconnect, these three signal copies (SigA , SigB , SigC
in Figure 3.7) will not result in identical sample signal values in the receiving domain (RcvA ,
RcvB , RcvC ). Figure 3.8 shows a timing analysis of this circuit. For example, note that only
SigA will likely be sampled as a ‘1’ by the first clock edge of Clkrcv . However, because the
pulse is so long, the voters placed on the sampled values of the three signals will produce
output pulses that are two clock cycles wide (corresponding to the two middle clock edges
in the figure). Thus, this example shows that if the transmitted pulse is long enough, signal
skew will not cause an error if voters are placed on the three sampled signal paths.
In order to maximize throughput, a designer would desire to send the shortest pulse
possible. This section will consider the problem of determining the timing constraints on
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Clksnd

SigA

RcvA

SigB

RcvB

SigC

RcvC

V

VoterA

V

VoterB

V

VoterC

Clkrcv

Figure 3.7: An Example TMR Circuit Which Crosses Clock Domains.

SigA
SigB
SigC
Clkrcv
RcvA
RcvB
RcvC
Figure 3.8: Sampling of Three Delayed Signal Replicas.

that transmitted pulse. Figure 3.9 shows the transmission of three identical signals but where
the pulse length is minimized to be only as wide as a clock period of Clkrcv , or Trcv . There
is no signal skew between the three signals and it should be clear that no sampling error will
occur — all three will be correctly (concurrently) sampled by the clock edges in the figure,
and a voter on the sampled signals would produce an output pulse. In contrast, Figure 3.10
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shows the same signals but with signal skew. In particular, SigC has been delayed (due to
wiring delays) by Tskew and thus the sampled signals in the receiving clock domain will be
different.

Tpw ≥ Trcv
SigA
SigB
SigC
Clkrcv
RcvA
RcvB
RcvC
Figure 3.9: Sending Three Minimum Width Pulses.

Figure 3.11 shows the effects of such sampling discrepancies. In the top half of the
figure there are no SEUs and, as shown, voters operating on three different received signals
will correctly produce output pulses in each case (for brevity of the figure, only the output of
voter A is shown). This is in spite of the fact that in Cases 2 and 3 a sampling disagreement
event has occurred.
The lower half of the figure shows the situation with SEUs present. In Case 1 a fault
on one of the domains does not cause any errors since no sampling disagreement event has
occurred. In Case 3 a sampling disagreement event occurs but the fault has occurred on the
out-of-phase signal and voters will produce the correct outputs as shown. It is in Case 2
where a fault combined with sampling uncertainty can cause a failure of the circuit. This
indicates that a simple constraint on transmitted pulse width of Tpw ≥ Trcv is insufficient for
proper operation.
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Tpw ≥ Trcv
SigA
SigB
SigC
Clkrcv
RcvA
RcvB
RcvC
Figure 3.10: Signal skew effects.

To overcome the problem illustrated in Figure 3.11, the pulse width of the transmitted
signals must be increased by the amount of the maximum signal skew (Tskew = delaymax −
delaymin ). This is shown in Figure 3.12, where the transmitted pulses have all been stretched
in time by Tskew . This ensures that, in spite of any possible relative delays between the three
signal copies, a fault cannot cause a sampling event to result in a voting error. Specifically,
note that although SigB and SigC have been delayed by a significant amount (Tskew ), all
three signals will be concurrently sampled by the middle clock edge in the figure and Case
2 of Figure 3.11 cannot occur.
Thus, the constraint on minimum pulse width for sending triplicated signals across a
clock domain is given by:
Tpw ≥ Trcv + Tskew .

(3.7)

If this constraint is obeyed, then the combination of SEUs, sampling uncertainty, and signal
skew will not cause a voting error.

43

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

RcvA
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RcvC
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Stuck-at-’0’ fault

RcvA

‘0’

RcvB

w/ SEUs

RcvC
VoterA

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Figure 3.11: Sampling Uncertainty and SEU Lead to TMR Failure.

3.4

Summary
In this chapter, several issues of asynchronous signal sampling with TMR are dis-

cussed. First, meta-stability is inevitable when sampling asynchronous signals, but appropriate synchronizer designs such as the one shown in Figure 3.2 can provide sufficiently long
MTTF. With appropriate synchronization, the occurrence of meta-stability are many orders
of magnitude less than other circuit failure modes, thus its effect can be ignored. Second,
asynchronous sampling uncertainty occurs because of signal skew, the difference of wire delays in the triplicated circuit. When asynchronous sampling uncertainty and SEU occur
simultaneously at the same place, the synchronizer would fail. If a certain timing constraint
on minimum signal pulse width is met (Equation 3.7), then the failure due to signal skew
can be overcome.
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Tpw ≥ Trcv + Tskew
SigA
SigB
SigC
Clkrcv
RcvA
RcvB
RcvC
Figure 3.12: Increasing Tpw Overcomes Failure Due to Signal Skew.

In Chapter 4, several types of synchronizers for TMR circuits with clock domain
crossing are proposed and validated.
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Chapter 4
Mitigation Solutions and Fault Injection Tests
A general mitigation solution for TMR circuits with clock domain crossing is shown
in Figure 4.1 and consists of two parts. The first part is the creation of a synchronizer
block which will ensure that the transmitted pulses are concurrently sampled by at least one
clock edge in the receiving clock domain. The second part is a bank of voters which will
compensate for SEUs which may occur in the synchronizer blocks. In this chapter we present
two different mitigation solutions whose differences lie in how their synchronizer blocks are
constructed. These differences will stem primarily from the characteristics of the originally
transmitted signals.

Sig_A

Sig_B

Sig_C

rcvSig_A
Synchronizer

Voter
rcvSig_B

Synchronizer

Synchronizer

Voter
rcvSig_C

Voter

out_A

out_B

out_C

Figure 4.1: A Block Diagram of a General TMR Synchronizer Solution.

In addition, fault injection tests were conducted to validate the proposed synchronizers. This chapter describes these tests and summarizes the obtained results. Lastly, the
MTTF of several types of synchronizers are estimated and compared.
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4.1

Long Pulse Synchronization
The discussion of the previous chapter has shown that if sufficiently long pulses are

transmitted across a clock domain they can be reliably sampled in the receiving domain in
spite of differences of arrival time due to variations in wiring delay and sampling uncertainty.
Thus, if the inequality of Equation 3.7 holds, the circuit of Figure 3.2 can be used as the
synchronizer block of Figure 4.1 to create a TMR clock crossing circuit. This is shown in
Figure 4.2.

Sig_A

out_A

FF1

FF2

Voter

FF1

FF2

Voter

out_B

Voter
FF1

FF2

out_C

Sig_B

Sig_C

Figure 4.2: A TMR Synchronizer Design.

Typically, a pulse is sent from the sender’s domain to the receiver’s domain using
some number of sender’s clock cycles. Thus, to compute the number of sender’s clock cycles
required, the following equation should be used:
n ≥ dTpw /Tsnd e,

(4.1)

where n is the number of sending domain’s clock cycles.
Just as there is a pulse width constraint for a transmitted signal, the timing of the
spacing between pulses follows the same analysis. Thus, the time between pulses must also
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satisfy the constraint of Equation 3.7, and the maximum transfer rate using the circuit of
Figure 4.2 can be computed as one transfer every 2 × n × Tsnd seconds.
Finally, note that depending on the actual transmitted pulse width chosen, the outputs of the voters in Figure 4.2 may be a single clock cycle wide or multiple cycles wide. If
desired, edge detectors may be placed on the voter outputs to produce single-cycle signals
to the receiving domain.
4.2

Short Pulse Synchronization
The key to the above technique is that Equation 3.7 dictates how the sent pulse must

be stretched in time by the sender to account for signal skew and to ensure correct voting
behavior. However, it is not always possible to stretch the pulse in the sending domain. For
example, this would be the case when interfacing with an existing sub-system which cannot
be modified. In this case, Equation 3.7 could still be consulted to determine whether the
circuit of Figure 4.2 could be used. That is, can a suitable value of Trcv be found for the
given Tpw and Tskew ? If not, an alternative approach must be employed.
Figure 4.3 shows an alternate synchronizer from [53] which can be used in these scenarios. The function of this synchronizer is to stretch the transmitted pulse in the receiver’s
domain so that the receiving circuitry can correctly sense it. This is in contrast to the circuit of Figure 4.2 which requires the transmitted pulse to be stretched appropriately in the
sender’s domain before being sent.

Sender’s domain

Receiver’s domain

latch_out

sendSig
S
R

Q

ff1_out
D

Q

CLK

ff2_in D

Q

rcvSig

CLK

rcvClk

Figure 4.3: A Synchronizer for Sending a Short Pulse Across a Clock Domain.
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This does not, however, eliminate any constraint on the transmitted pulse but rather
introduces different constraints. The first constraint is that the transmitted pulse must be
long enough to properly set the latch (Tpw ≥ Tset ). In addition, there is a maximum pulse
width constraint. That is, the sent pulse must have returned to zero prior to the feedback
signal arriving to reset the front end latch. Otherwise, both R and S will be asserted at
the same time, resulting in undefined operation of the latch. Finally, there is a maximum
transfer rate imposed by the design. The sender cannot send another pulse across the domain
boundary using this circuit until: (1) the previous pulse has been received, (2) the latch reset,
and (3) the latch reset signal has been de-asserted. Just as with the previous synchronizer
design, failure to abide by the implied protocol associated with the synchronizer will result
in failure.
However, triplicated circuits constructed based on the circuit of Figure 4.3 may still
fail due to the combined effect of sampling uncertainty and SEUs and thus must be modified
before use. In this section, we present a modification to this synchronizer circuit and the
resulting TMR solution. We then provide a timing analysis to show correctness.
A modified version of the synchronizer of [53] is shown in Figure 4.4, where an additional flip-flop has been added on the right of the original circuit to stretch the received
signal pulse in the receiver’s domain by one additional clock cycle. Figure 4.5 shows the
timing diagram of the modified circuit.

Sender’s domain

Receiver’s domain

latch_out
sendSig
S
R

Q

ff1_out
D
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Q ff3_in D

CLK

rcvClk

Figure 4.4: A Modified Synchronizer Design.
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rcvSig

sendSig
rcvClk
latch_out
rcvSig
Figure 4.5: The Timing Diagram of the Modified Synchronizer.

In the remainder of this section we analyze a triplicated synchronizer design such
as is shown by Figure 4.1 where the “synchronizer” block is the modified synchronizer of
Figure 4.4.
4.2.1

Solution Correctness Without Considering SEUs
Assuming no SEUs, we only need to consider the effect of sampling uncertainty, and

there are three possibilities that we need to consider. As shown in Figure 4.6 it is obvious
that in all the three cases, voters are sufficient to determine the outputs, because at most
one of the three signals could be different from the other two.

2 clock cycles

3 clock cycles

3 clock cycles

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

rcvSig_A
rcvSig_B
rcvSig_C
VoterOut

Figure 4.6: The Three Cases without the Effect of SEUs.
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4.2.2

Solution Correctness With SEUs
In the presence of SEUs, any signal could be stuck at ‘0’ or ‘1’ and there are four

different cases that must be considered as shown in Figure 4.7. When signal rcvSig A is
stuck at ‘1’, there are two possibilities (shown by the left half of Figure 4.7): signals rcvSig B
and rcvSig C are off by one clock cycle (case 1), or they are identical (case 2). In case 1,
signal V oterOut lasts for three clock cycles, and in case 2 it lasts for two clock cycles.
When signal rcvSig A is stuck at ’0’, we have two cases to consider as well (the right
half of Figure 4.7). In case 3, signals rcvSig B and rcvSig C are off by one clock cycle, and
signal V oterOut lasts for 1 cycle. In case 4, signals rcvSig B and rcvSig C are identical,
and signal V oterOut lasts for 2 cycles. As shown, however, in each case the received signals
overlap sufficiently that voters can accurately detect the pulses.

3 cycles
rcvSig_A

2 cycles

`1`

3 cycles

2 cycles

Case 3

Case 4

`0`

rcvSig_B
rcvSig_C
VoterOut

Case 1

Case 2

Figure 4.7: Four Cases with the Presence of SEUs.

4.3

Fault Injection Tests
To validate the reliability improvement provided by the proposed synchronizers, we

performed fault injection experiments on our different circuits using a SEAKR Radiation
Test Board, which contains three Xilinx FPGAs. One is a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA, which
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holds the design under test (DUT). The other two are Xilinx Virtex-2 Pro FPGAs, acting as
the configuration monitor (Configmon) and the functional monitor (Funcmon), respectively.
A block diagram of part of the test fixture is shown by Figure 4.8, where the DUT is
shown containing one of the synchronizers tested but with edge detectors on the outputs to
ensure that the received pulses are exactly one clock cycle wide in the receiving domain.
In the Funcmon, the pulse generator (on the left of Figure 4.8) operates in the sender’s
clock domain and generates a sequence of one million pulses. The pulse receiver (right side
of figure) is in the receiver’s clock domain, and counts the number of pulses it receives from
the DUT.

DUT
Corrupted bitstream
Synchronizer

Voter

Edge
detector

Synchronizer

Voter

Edge
detector

Synchronizer

Voter

Edge
detector

HOST PC

Comparison result

CONFIGMON

Receiver’s domain

FUNCMON
v
Pulse generator
&
counter

Sender’s domain

Fault
Injector

Pulse receiver
&
counter

Receiver’s domain

Comparison result

Figure 4.8: Block Diagram the Fault Injection Test Fixture for the Mitigated Synchronizer.
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The purpose of the Configmon is to generate bitstreams with injected faults, which
are sent to the DUT. To fully test the behavior of the circuit in the presence of SEUs, all
configuration bits of the design were upset, one at a time, with test results reported back to
a host system.
In all, we carried out two sets of experiments: one on long pulse synchronizers and the
other on short pulse synchronizers. Each set included three types of designs - a single synchronizer, a naive/incorrectly triplicated synchronizer, and a modified/correctly triplicated
synchronizer. All the triplicated versions include voters as they are required by the nature
of TMR. In each case, the bitstream was upset and programmed into the DUT and then one
million pulses were transmitted to the DUT by the Funcmon. After this was completed, if
the pulse receiver’s counter did not match the pulse sender’s counter, we called it a failure
of the synchronizer, and the corresponding upset bit in FPGA configuration memory was
marked as a sensitive bit. The percentage of signals that arrived at the receiver’s domain for
the runs containing sensitive bits was then determined and termed “Signal Arrival %”. The
results are summarized in Table 4.1.
4.3.1

Long Pulse Synchronizers
A basic, single long pulse synchronizer is shown in Figure 3.2 and is a conventional

meta-stability filter. Fault injection identified 18 sensitive bits for this design. Because this
circuit contains no redundancy, when an SEU occurred at a sensitive bit location no pulses
arrived at the receiver’s domain (they were all catastrophic failures).
We then tested the design of Figure 4.2, with an artificially inserted delay on one
of the three signal paths so that Equation 3.7 was violated. Testing with this uncovered
105 sensitive bits. Failures in this experiment were caused by the combined effects of both
sampling uncertainty and SEU. When an SEU occurred at a sensitive bit, the synchronizer
failed in accordance with the probability of sampling uncertainty. On average, 47% of the sent
signals were successfully received at the receiver’s domain. In other words, the synchronizer
of this experiment failed at a probability of 53% with the presence of an SEU at a sensitive
bit location. This is shown as “Naive TMR”in Table 4.1 because it fails to take into account
the constraint of Equation 3.7.
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The third test was also on the design of Figure 4.2, only without artificial skew
among the three signals (Equation 3.7 was satisfied). This circuit resulted in no sensitive
bits, suggesting that this synchronizer mitigates all SEUs in combination with sampling
uncertainty.
4.3.2

Short Pulse Synchronizers
By fault injecting the basic single short pulse synchronizer of Figure 4.3, we observed

147 sensitive bits and 0% signal arrival percentage.
We then tested a naively triplicated version of the design above. Fault injection
identified 188 sensitive bits in this design. In addition, 99.58% of the sent pulses were
correctly received at the receiver’s domain.
Finally, we combined three copies of the modified synchronizer circuit of Figure 4.4
with voters. This circuit resulted in no sensitive bits, suggesting that this synchronizer
mitigates all SEUs in combination with sampling uncertainty.

Table 4.1: Fault Injection Test Results of Three Synchronizers

Long Pulse
Single
Synchronizer Naive TMR
Correct TMR
Short Pulse
Single
Synchronizer Naive TMR
Correct TMR

4.4

#Sensitive
Signal
Size
Latency
Bits
Arrival % (slices) (clocks)
18
0%
2
1
105
47%
9
1
0
100%
9
1
147
0%
3
1
188
99.58%
9
1
0
100%
15
2

Reliability Comparison
In this section, we compare the reliability of the various synchronizers from the previ-

ous section. In each reliability model of this section, we assume use of a Xilinx Virtex-4QV
FPGA operating in the geostationary earth orbit (GEO). In this orbit, the expected upset
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rate of a single configuration bit is λbit = 2.78 × 10−7 upsets per day [59]. The reliability of
each synchronizer will be evaluated in terms of mean time to failure (MTTF).
4.4.1

Non-Mitigated Synchronizers
The first model estimates the reliability of an unmitigated synchronizer and will be

used to estimate the MTTF of the non-mitigated single synchronizers (Figure 3.2 and Figure 4.3). SEUs are the primary failure mechanism for non-mitigated synchronizers. The
failure rate due to SEUs can be estimated by multiplying the failure rate of a single configuration bit, λbit , by the number of sensitive configuration bits in the synchronizer, N , or
λN = λbit · N . Assuming a constant failure rate, the MTTF is the inverse of the failure rate
or,
MT T F =

1
.
λbit · N

(4.2)

From the fault injection results in Table 4.1 we know the number of bits that are
susceptible to SEUs for both the non-mitigated long pulse synchronizer (Nlong = 18) and the
non-mitigated short pulse synchronizer (Nshort = 147). The fault injection experiments also
indicate that once the synchronizer has failed, no signals arrived implying complete failure of
the synchronizer. Using these results, the failure rate for the two unmitigated synchronizers
is M T T Flong = 2.00 × 105 days and M T T Fshort = 2.45 × 104 days.
4.4.2

Naive Triplicated Synchronizers
For a triplicated synchronizer that does not properly account for sampling uncertainty,

two conditions are needed simultaneously for synchronizer failure. First, an SEU must occur
within the synchronizer logic to disable one of the three identical synchronizers. Second, a
sampling disagreement must occur between the two working synchronizers. The failure due to
SEUs is modeled as λbit · N as described above. The probability of a sampling disagreement
is modeled as (1 − pss ) where pss is the probability of a successful synchronization. The
probability of successful synchronization for both the long and short naive synchronizers is
found in Table 4.1. Therefore, the MTTF of naive triplicated synchronizers with sampling
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uncertainty is modeled as
MT T F =

1
.
λbit · N · (1 − pss )

(4.3)

Fault injection results for the triplicated long synchronizer with insufficient pulse
width show that only 47% of the synchronization signals arrived in the presence of a sensitive
SEU. With 105 sensitive SEUs, M T T Flong = 6.4 × 104 days which is lower than the MTTF
of the unmitigated synchronizer. The MTTF of the naive triplicated short synchronizer,
however, is much higher as 99.58% of the synchronization pulses arrive in the presence of a
sensitive SEU. With 188 sensitive SEUs, M T T Fshort = 4.56 × 106 days.
4.4.3

Correctly Triplicated Synchronizers
No failures were observed in the fault injection experiments for either the long or short

pulse synchronizers that properly accounted for synchronizer pulse width. These results
suggest that these circuits are immune to any single event upset within their configuration
memory whether or not synchronization differences occur. Since no failures were observed,
the simple reliability model presented above cannot be used.
To compare the reliability of these synchronizers with the previous two synchronizers,
an alternate model is proposed. This model will estimate the probability that two or more
SEUs occur and disable two of the three synchronizers. As aforementioned in Chapter 2, to
avoid the accumulation of upsets within the FPGA configuration memory, systems utilizing
FPGAs in a radiation environment can employ configuration scrubbing [60] to mitigate SEU
effects. The reliability model for TMR with configuration scrubbing is derived as [12]:
MT T F =

5λ + µ
,
6λ2

(4.4)

where λ is the module failure rate1 , and µ is the repair rate.
Since these synchronizers do not actually have any sensitive bits, we have to make
an assumption for the module failure rate (i.e., the failure rate of a single module). For this
calculation we will use λ from above as the failure rate of one of the three circuit copies
1

This λ is the module failure rate for one of the three copies of the circuit which make up the TMR
module itself.
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that make up our mitigated synchronizer. We also assume a conservative scrub rate of 1Hz,
giving a value of 86400 repairs/day.
Substituting these values into Equation 4.4, the MTTF of the triplicated long synchronizer is estimated as 5.75×1014 days and the MTTF of the triplicated short synchronizer
is estimated as 8.63 × 1012 days. Table 4.2 summarizes the MTTF of the six different synchronizer designs.

Table 4.2: Estimated MTTF of Synchronizers (days)

Single
Naive TMR
Correct TMR

4.5

Long Pulse
2.00 × 105
6.4 × 104
5.75 × 1014

Short Pulse
2.45 × 104
4.56 × 106
8.63 × 1012

Summary
In this chapter, two different types of TMR synchronizers are proposed based on the

length of the signal being sent. The functional correctness of the proposed synchronizers
are analyzed. Then fault injection testing is used to demonstrate the performance of each.
In addition, the MTTF of the correctly mitigated synchronizers is calculated and compared
against simple triplicated synchronizers. The results show that correctly mitigated synchronizers have between 6 and 10 orders of magnitude longer MTTFs than simple triplicated
synchronizers.
Other than reliable signal transmission between asynchronous clock domains in TMR
circuits, this dissertation also focuses on the reliability of data storage in FPGAs. Chapter
5 gives an overview of prior work on reliability models for memories. The models are then
compared and analyzed. This analysis leads to the motivations for proposing new reliability
models.
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Chapter 5
Overview of Reliability Models for SEC/DED Memories with Scrubbing
As mentioned in Chapter 1, TMR is prohibitively expensive for some structures such
as memory. Error correcting codes (ECC) have much lower overhead in area and therefore are
often used for memory systems as an alternative. In this chapter and the following chapters,
we will focus on the reliability of user memories protected by ECC in FPGAs. Block RAMs
(BRAMs) are widely used in Xilinx FPGAs to store user data. BRAMs are smaller and
more distributed than traditional memories. In addition, the depth and width of BRAMs
in Xilinx FPGAs are configurable [8], [9], making them more flexible to fit the functionality
of various modules or designs. For example, in digital signal processing (DSP) applications,
different modules usually perform different operations on the data. This would result in
different BRAM sizes and non-uniform write access patterns to the BRAMs. As previously
mentioned in Chapter 2, the reliability of BRAMs can be jeopardized by radiation-induced
SEUs and require mitigation techniques.
SEC/DED codes, a kind of ECC, are a fault tolerant technique that is usually applied
to protect memory systems. SEC/DED codes can detect any single-bit error in a memory
word and correct it immediately, as well as detect but not correct double-bit errors. In some
newest FPGAs such as the Xilinx Virtex-5, BRAMs are protected by built-in SEC/DED [9].
However, when a word is corrupted by a single-bit error, the data is only corrected on the
output port, while the corrupted word remains erroneous in the memory storage. As errors
accumulate in the memory, multiple faults in a word would eventually defeat the redundancy
provided by SEC/DED codes.
Thus scrubbing, another fault tolerant technique, is often employed along with SEC/DED
codes to prevent a memory from accumulating a second error in a single word. As introduced
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in Chapter 2, scrubbing can be divided into two categories based on the distribution of scrubbing events: deterministic scrubbing and probabilistic scrubbing. For large memory systems,
scrubbing is required in addition to SEC/DED to provide a satisfactory reliability [10].
Other researchers have investigated the problem of memory reliability over the past
decades [10], [61], [62], [11]. Both [10] and [11] have provided reliability/MTTF models for
SEC/DED memories with deterministic scrubbing only. Saleh et al. [10] have provided a
reliability/MTTF model for SEC/DED memories with probabilistic scrubbing only but do
not differentiate between read and write scrubbing. These models will be introduced and
compared in this chapter. More details of the derivation of these models are presented in
Appendix B.
In Chapter 6, the impact of non-uniform write distributions on memory reliability
will be discussed, and new models reflecting this impact will be derived and discussed.
5.1

Saleh’s Deterministic Model
In [10], Saleh et al. proposed a reliability model for SEC/DED memories with de-

terministic scrubbing. This model was developed for caches in desktop computing devices
rather than for embedded FPGA memories. Thus it is a different environment than FPGA
applications, but the modeling process and some of their assumptions still apply.
Saleh’s deterministic model made four assumptions:
• Transient faults occur with the Poisson distribution.
• All the bit flips are statistically independent.
• A second bit flip in a single word does not correct the first one.
• Every word is considered as an entity with error rate λN , where λ is the bit failure
rate, and N is the number of bits in a single word.
The MTTF estimate of Saleh’s deterministic model is given in Table 5.1. In the
MTTF equation, ν is the deterministic scrub rate enforced by the scrubber, and M is the
number of words in the memory.
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Table 5.1: Saleh’s Deterministic Model

Memory System

MTTF

SEC/DED with deterministic scrubbing

2ν
M λ2 N 2

This model disregards some relatively insignificant terms in the derivation process for
the sake of simplification. Thus it is only valid for memory size less than 1 GByte and failure
rate lower than 10−4 upsets/bit-day [10] (the raw bit failure rate of Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA
in a geosynchronous orbit is 1.97 × 10−11 ). These approximations also lead to conservative
results for MTTF.
5.2

Edmonds’ Deterministic Model
Edmonds et al. [11] proposed another reliability model for SEC/DED memories

with deterministic scrubbing. This model was created for BRAMs on a Xilinx FPGA,
XQR5VFX130 [9], and therefore had a similar context to the proposed models of this dissertation. Edmonds’ model also made four assumptions:
• Transient faults occur with a Poisson distribution.
• All the bit flips are statistically independent.
• A second bit flip in a single word does not correct the first one.
• Every bit has an error rate of λ.
All the assumptions of Edmonds’ deterministic model are the same as those of Saleh’s
deterministic model, except for the fourth one. Edmonds’ deterministic model assumes that
the error rate of a word depends on the number of existing errors. For example, if a word
has no error, then its error rate is λN ; if it already has one error, then its error rate for the
second error will be λ(N − 1). Saleh’s deterministic model, however, assumes that the error
rate of a word is always λN without distinguishing between the rates of the first error and
the second one. Other than this difference, Saleh and Edmonds made identical assumptions.
Table 5.2 gives the equation of Edmonds’ deterministic model.
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Table 5.2: Edmonds’ Deterministic Model

Memory System

MTTF

SEC/DED with deterministic scrubbing

2ν
M λ2 N (N −1)

Edmonds’ deterministic model also made some approximations during the derivation
in order to give an easy-to-use formula. These simplifications make the model conservative.
5.3

Saleh’s Probabilistic Model
Saleh et al. also presented a model for SEC/DED memories with probabilistic scrub-

bing [10]. This model assumes that a word is read and checked whenever it is addressed
(written or read) by the program in execution. It also assumes that the cache memory locations are somewhat evenly accessed due to the least recently used (LRU) approach used to
manage lines in cache memories.
In Saleh’s probabilistic model, µ represents the probabilistic scrub rate. Unlike the
scrub interval in deterministic scrubbing, which is fixed, scrub interval in probabilistic scrubbing distributes exponentially with a rate of 1/µ. The mathematical expression of Saleh’s
probabilistic model is presented by Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Saleh’s Probabilistic Model

5.4

Memory System

MTTF

SEC/DED with probabilistic scrubbing

µ
M λ2 N 2

Comparison of the Two Deterministic Models
It is worth noting that although Saleh’s deterministic model and Edmonds’ deter-

ministic model take different derivation approaches, they give almost the same results for
MTTF of SEC/DED memories with deterministic scrubbing. Specifically, the ratio of the
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results given by Saleh’s model and Edmonds’ model is (N − 1)/N . Since N is the number
of bits per word, usually being 36 or 72, this difference is very small. As pointed out above,
the difference between the two comes from a different assumption about the error rate of a
single word. Saleh’s model considers every word as a statistically independent entity with
error rate λN , while Edmonds’ model considers every bit with an independent error rate
λ [11]. The assumption of Saleh’s model makes it less accurate and more conservative than
Edmonds’ model. Figure 5.1 shows the comparison between the two models, and Table 5.4
lists the parameter values chosen for the comparison.

Table 5.4: Parameters Used for Model Comparison

M
N
ν
512 72 1 per second

5.5

Motivations of the Proposed Models
In Chapter 2, it has been pointed out that probabilistic scrubbing can occur when a

word is being written or read. Although probabilistic read scrubbing has performance and
area overhead by requiring additional circuitry and clock cycle to complete, probabilistic
write scrubbing comes for free as new (and therefore correct) data will be written into the
word on write operations. Saleh’s probabilistic model does not differentiate between read
and write scrubbing. Additionally, because of the context of cache memory in which it was
developed, Saleh’s probabilistic model assumes a uniform scrub rate for all the memory locations. However, this is not always true for FPGA applications. For example, in digital signal
processing (DSP) applications, different modules usually perform different operations on the
data. This would result in different BRAM sizes and non-uniform write access patterns to the
BRAMs. In order to study the reliability of the memory on FPGAs, a new reliability model
will be proposed by this dissertation which considers only probabilistic write scrubbing, and
which takes into account non-uniform write rates for different memory locations.
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Figure 5.1: Comparison between Saleh’s Deterministic Model and Edmonds’ Deterministic
Model for SEC/DED Memories.

Furthermore, although Saleh’s deterministic model and Edmonds’ deterministic model
both aim at memories with deterministic scrubbing, none of the prior work has proposed
models which combine both deterministic scrubbing and probabilistic scrubbing in the same
model. As discussed above, probabilistic scrubbing occurs whenever a word is being overwritten and therefore should be included. The second model proposed by this dissertation
will combine both types of scrubbing.
Table 5.5 gives a summary of possible types of scrubbing for SEC/DED memories.
Type 1 is SEC/DED only, where no scrubbing of any kind is employed. Although
SEC/DED provides a certain level of protection against single-bit errors, it fails when multiple errors accumulate in a single word. Although this type of memory may be reliable for
some ground based systems, it is very unreliable in space environment.
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Table 5.5: Summary of Possible Types of Scrubbing for SEC/DED Memory

Number Type of Scrubbing
1
No scrubbing
2
Probabilistic scrubbing
(read only)
3
Probabilistic scrubbing
(write only)
4
Probabilistic scrubbing
(read + write)
5
Deterministic scrubbing
6
7
8

Note
Unreliable
Unrealistic
Proposed work

Deterministic and
probabilistic (write only)
Deterministic and
probabilistic (read only)
Deterministic and
probabilistic (read + write)

Saleh’s probabilistic model
Performance and area overhead
Saleh’s deterministic model and
Edmonds’ deterministic model
Proposed work
Unrealistic
Performance and area overhead

Type 2 is SEC/DED memories which employ probabilistic read scrubbing. This case
is unrealistic because as stated above, probabilistic write scrubbing always occurs and should
be considered.
Type 3 takes into account probabilistic write scrubbing. Note that this type of scrubbing does not need to be “applied” as it always occurs when the circuit is running. A new
mathematical model for type 3 is proposed in this dissertation as it applies to FPGA applications. Since write rates to different memory locations usually differ, the proposed model
takes per-word write rates to derive an accurate result.
Saleh’s probabilistic model has solved Type 4. However, it results in performance as
well as area overhead for FPGA applications. Another problem it has is that it assumes
an average access rate µ for every memory location, which is not always true for FPGA
applications.
Type 5, memories with deterministic scrubbing, has been solved by both Saleh’s
deterministic model and Edmonds’ deterministic model. But they fail to take into account
probabilistic write scrubbing. As mentioned above, probabilistic write scrubbing always
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takes place and should not be ignored. Therefore Saleh’s deterministic model and Edmonds’
deterministic model give inaccurate results by underestimating the memory reliability.
In order to provide more accurate MTTF estimate than Saleh’s and Edmonds’ deterministic models, a new model that integrates both probabilistic write scrubbing and deterministic scrubbing is proposed by this dissertation. It corresponds to scrubbing type 6.
Similar to type 3, this model will also take per-word write rates. The proposed model for
type 6 does not employ probabilistic read scrubbing, because of applicability to FPGAs.
Type 7 involves deterministic and probabilistic read scrubbing. This case is unrealistic
for the same reason as type 2.
Similar to type 4, type 8 also leads to performance and area overhead because it
involves probabilistic read scrubbing.
The main contribution of the proposed models is that they will allow for a more
accurate and thorough understanding of memory reliability by providing MTTF estimates
that are applicable to FPGAs. If a memory involves frequent write operations, it is likely
to survive with a lower deterministic scrub rate or with no deterministic scrubbing at all.
For example, deterministic scrubbing is not necessary for a FIFO because it already involves
sufficient writes (probabilistic scrubbing). In this case, the proposed model for type 3 in
Table 5.5 can be used. Otherwise, if deterministic scrubbing is necessary as a supplement
to probabilistic write scrubbing, the proposed model for type 6 can be applied. The two
proposed models will suggest that the deterministic scrub rate may be lower than otherwise
predicted because probabilistic write scrubbing can compensate for the difference. This
suggests that designers may have previously over-engineered their memories because existing
models gave them estimates that were way too conservative. The problem of over-scrubbing
could lead to unnecessary waste of power and design effort.
Furthermore, different memory locations usually have different write rates. For example, rarely modified memory locations such as look-up tables may be written only once
while locations in a RAM may be overwritten frequently. The difference in write rates among
memory locations may have considerable impact on the reliability of a memory system. Consequently, it is important for the new model to reveal the relation between memory write
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distribution and reliability. By using per-word write rates, the proposed models will be able
to give more accurate results than other models.
5.6

Summary
Other reliability models have been proposed for SEC/DED memories with scrubbing.

These models either assume uniform probabilistic scrub rate or consider deterministic only,
none of which is realistic for FPGA applications. In this dissertation, two new reliability
models will be developed. The first one considers only probabilistic scrubbing, and takes
into account non-uniform write rates for different memory locations. The second model will
combine both probabilistic write scrubbing and deterministic scrubbing in the same model.
The new models proposed by this dissertation will be able to provide more accurate
estimates than other models. Detailed deriving process of the proposed models will be given
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Derivation and Analysis of the Proposed Models
In Chapter 5, several reliability models for SEC/DED memories with scrubbing were
reviewed, and the motivations of developing new models that are suitable for FPGA applications were discussed. In this chapter, two proposed models will be derived and analyzed.
The first model is for non-uniform probabilistic scrubbing which considers the write rate of
each individual memory location. The second model combines both probabilistic scrubbing
and deterministic scrubbing, which is called mixed scrubbing in this dissertation. Several
insights revealed by the proposed models will be discussed. In addition, results of the Monte
Carlo simulations that are used for validating the proposed models will be presented.
6.1

Proposed Model for Probabilistic Write Scrubbing
In the first model, only probabilistic write scrubbing is considered as means of memory

protection, and non-uniform write distribution is taken into account. Compared to Saleh’s
probabilistic model, it will be more suitable for FPGA applications such as DSP.
6.1.1

Mathematical Expression
The proposed models will be built on the following assumptions:

• Transient faults occur with a Poisson distribution.
• All the bit flips are statistically independent.
• A second bit flip in a word does not correct the first one.
• Every bit has an independent error rate λ.
• Every word i has its own write rate µi .
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The first three assumptions are the same as those of Saleh’s and Edmonds’ deterministic model. The fourth assumption differs from that of Saleh’s deterministic model,
which considers each N -bit word as an independent entity. This will result in a more accurate model than Saleh’s model. The fifth assumption is a new one that is introduced by
the proposed model, and again will allow for a more accurate model and novel insights of
the relation between write rates and reliability. This assumption, however, requires more
parameters and a more detailed understanding on how the memory is used.
This subsection presents the derivation of the proposed model for probabilistic write
scrubbing. This memory system has non-uniform write distribution, meaning that the write
rate is different for each word. When a memory location is overwritten, the new word
can be considered as correct. Thus write operations can be considered as equivalent to
repair processes. The memory fails whenever two errors accumulate in one word to defeat
the capability of the SEC/DED protection. For a single word, both the failure and the
repair processes occur continuously and independently, therefore their occurrences follow
the Poisson distribution which has been discussed in Chapter 2. The time interval between
two writes or two bit errors in the same memory location is not fixed and can be modeled
by exponential distribution. Thus, this random process can be well modeled using a Markov
model.
Markov Model The continuous-time Markov model of a single word i is given in Figure 6.1. Each state represents the number of errors in the word, and the directed arcs
between states indicate the transition rate from one state to another. For example, if the
total number of bits in the word is N , and each bit has the same failure rate λ, then the
failure rate of the entire word is λN , which is labeled on the arrow pointing from state 0 to
state 1. If the word is already in state 1, then a write operation will bring it back to state 0
because the single-bit error is corrected. Therefore the transition rate from state 1 to state
0 is the write rate µi . State 2 is the failing state, or the absorbing state, of a word when
SEC/DED is used, so there is no outgoing arc from state 2.
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λ(N-1)

λN

0

1

2

μi
Figure 6.1: State Transition Rate Diagram for Word i with write rate µi

From Figure 6.1 we can write the following transition matrix:






−λN

λN

µi

−λ(N − 1) − µi

0

0

0





λ(N − 1)  .

0

MTTF of a Single Word The solution to this Markov chain can be obtained by defining
Pi (t) as being the probability of reaching state i in the time interval [0, t]. From the transition matrix, we can get the following set of differential equations (Chapman-Kolmogorov
equations) which represents the dynamics of the probability system [10]:
dp0 (t)
= −λN p0 (t) + µi p1 (t),
dt
dp1 (t)
= λN p0 (t) − [λ(N − 1) + µi ]p1 (t),
dt
dp2 (t)
= λ(N − 1)p1 (t).
dt

(6.1)

Taking the Laplace transform for the set of equations in Equation 6.1 gives
sp0 (s) − p0 (0) = −λN p0 (s) + µi p1 (s),
sp1 (s) − p1 (0) = λN p0 (s) − [λ(N − 1) + µi ]p1 (s),
sp2 (s) − p2 (0) = λ(N − 1)p1 (s).
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(6.2)

Then, by adjusting the set of equations in Equation 6.2, we get
p0 (0) = (s + λN )p0 (s) − µi p1 (s),
p1 (0) = −λN p0 (s) + [s + λ(N − 1) + µi ]p1 (s),

(6.3)

p2 (0) = −λ(N − 1)p1 (s) + sp2 (s).
Therefore the vector P ~(0) can be expressed as
P ~(0) = P ~(s) × A,
where




A=


−λN

s + λN



0

−µi

s + λ(N − 1) + µi

0

0



−λ(N − 1)  .

s

It is assumed that the word has no error at time 0. In other words, the probability
that the word is in state 0 at time 0 is 1. Therefore we get
P ~(s) = P ~(0) × A−1
h
i
= 1 0 0 × A−1 .
Then p2 (s) can be calculated as follows:

(−1)4 × det 
p2 (s) =

−λN

0

s + λ(N − 1) + µi −λ(N − 1)




detA
λ2 N 2 − λ2 N
=
(s + λN )(s2 + λs(N − 1) + µi ) − λµi N s
λ2 N (N − 1)
=
s[s2 + (2λN − λ + µi )s + λ2 N (N − 1)]
a
b
c
= +
+
,
s s + α1 s + α2

where α1 =

λ(2N −1)+µi −

√

λ2 +2λµi (2N −1)+µ2i
2

√

and α2 =
70

λ(2N −1)+µi +

λ2 +2λµi (2N −1)+µ2i
.
2

(6.4)

By solving Equation 6.4 for a, b, and c, we get

p2 (s) =

λ2 N (N −1)
α1 α2

s

+

λ2 N (N −1)
α1 (α1 −α2 )

s + α1

+

λ2 N (N −1)
α2 (α2 −α1 )

s + α2

.

(6.5)

By taking the inverse Laplace transform for Equation 6.5, it gives
λ2 N (N − 1) −α1 t λ2 N (N − 1) −α2 t
e
+
e
α1 (α1 − α2 )
α2 (α2 − α1 )
α2
α1
=1+
e−α1 t +
e−α2 t .
α1 − α2
α2 − α1

p2 (t) = 1 +

(6.6)

By definition, p2 (t) is the probability that the word is in state 2 after time interval
[0, t], and the reliability of the word is the probability that the word is in state 0 or state 1
at time instant t. Therefore we have
r(t) = 1 − p2 (t)
α2
α1
=
e−α1 t +
e−α2 t .
α2 − α1
α1 − α2

(6.7)

Then M T T Fi , the MTTF of the word is given by
Z
M T T Fi =
0

∞

r(t) dt
Z ∞

α1
α2
e−α1 t dt +
=
α2 − α1 0
α1 − α2
α1 + α2
=
α1 α2
λ(2N − 1) + µi
=
.
λ2 N (N − 1)

Z

∞

e−α2 t dt

0

(6.8)

MTTF of the Memory According to definition, the MTTF of the entire memory with
M words can be calculated by
Z
MT T F =

∞

Z
R(t) dt =

0

0
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M
∞Y
i=1

r(t) dt.

However, this equation leads to an extremely complex result which cannot be analytically
derived. Therefore we go back to Equation 6.7 and seek for possible simplifications.
Note that when µi is many orders of magnitude greater than λ (which is true for
FPGA applications, as long as the BRAM is being regularly written), α1 will approach 0.
In this case, we can make an approximation for ri (t), and we call the approximated value
ari (t):
ari (t) ≈ e−α1 t .

(6.9)

Figure 6.2 shows the ratio of ari (t) to ri (t) as the order of magnitude of the difference
between µ and λ increases. In the figure, µ increases from 10−8 to 106 per second while λ is
fixed at 1.97 ∗ 10−11 per second. Figure 6.2 shows that if µ is five orders of magnitude higher
than λ (higher than 10−6 ), then ari (t) can be viewed as a good approximation for ri (t).

−11

λ = 1.97*10

Ratio of the Approximate Value to the Exact Value

1.0001
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Figure 6.2: Ratio of the Approximated Reliability to the Exact Reliability.
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Equation 6.9 indicates that if µi  λ, then the reliability of word i follows an exponential distribution, and thus word i can be seen as an entity with a constant failure rate
γi :
1
M T T Fi
λ2 N (N − 1)
=
.
λ(2N − 1) + µi

γi =

Consequently, we can use the series model (Equation 2.6) to calculate the MTTF of the
entire memory:
M T T F = PM

1

1
i=1 M T T Fi

=

λ2 N (N − 1)

1
PM

1
i=1 λ(2N −1)+µi

.

(6.10)

Note that if µi is not orders of magnitude higher than λ (in extreme cases like a
ROM, µi could be zero), then Equation 6.10 is not accurate and should not be used. In
Equation 6.10, λ, M , and N can be seen as constants, and µi varies for different word i.
Intuitively, a larger memory size leads to a lower MTTF, and higher write rates can improve
the MTTF. These intuitions can be well reflected by this model.
Because the bit failure rate λ is usually orders of magnitude lower than the write
rate µi , the term λ(2N − 1) in Equation 6.10 can be discarded. The simplified equation for
MTTF can be expressed as
MT T F =

1
λ2 N (N − 1)

PM

1
i=1 µi

.

(6.11)

This approximation only has a tiny effect on the result, and makes the result more conservative. A special case of Equation 6.11 is when write rates are the same for all the words
(µi = µ for all i). Then it gives
MT T F =

µ
.
M λ2 N (N − 1)
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(6.12)

Note that Equation 6.12 gives a very similar expression to Saleh’s model for probabilistic
scrubbing (shown in Table 5.3). In Saleh’s model, µ, the probabilistic scrub rate, is the
access rate of a memory location, while in the proposed model it is the write rate because
only write operations are considered for probabilistic scrubbing.
6.1.2

Analysis 1 - Dividing a Memory into Groups
Equation 6.11 requires per-word write rates. However, it may be feasible to categorize

the words with similar write rates into one group, and then the words in the same group are
considered to have the same write rate instead of individual ones. This would simplify the
model and may help us use it to better understand the characteristics of probabilistic write
scrubbing. In order to investigate this feasibility, a special example is considered where
a memory consists of only two words and each word has its own write rate (µ1 and µ2 ,
respectively). Thus Equation 6.11 becomes
MT T F =

1
µ1 µ2
·
.
λ2 N (N − 1) µ1 + µ2

(6.13)

If the two words can be combined into one group with write rate of µ1 , then Equation 6.13
becomes
MT T F =

1
λ2 N (N

µ1
.
− 1) 2
·

(6.14)

In Figure 6.3, the curve shows the reliability of the combination of the two words
(Equation 6.13), and the horizontal line (M T T Fµ1 ) shows the MTTF when both words are
considered to have the same write rate of µ1 (Equation 6.14). The parameters used for this
experiment are listed in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Parameters Used for the Case of Two Words
−11

1.97 × 10

λ
N
upsets per bit-second 72 bits
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µ1
1 per second

In Figure 6.3, µ2 ranges from 0.8 to 1.2, and µ1 = 1. When µ1 = µ2 = 1, Equation 6.13
and Equation 6.14 are equivalent and give the same result. When µ2 is within the range of
µ1 ± 10% (between the two vertical dotted lines), the error introduced by combining word
1 and word 2 together with write rate µ1 is around 5% (between the two horizontal dotted
lines). This indicates that multiple words with close write rates can be combined into one
group without introducing significant error to the result.
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µ1 Only
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Figure 6.3: Combining Two Words with Similar Write Rates into One Group.

With the knowledge from the previous example, we would like to expand the case to
a larger number of words. Here is an example: there are in total 101 words in a memory, and
the write rate of word 1, µ1 , is 1. The write rates of 50 words distribute randomly in the open
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interval (0.9, 1), and the other 50 words in (1, 1.1). Thus µ1 is the median of all the write
rates. Two types of MTTF are calculated using Equation 6.11. The first one is calculated
with the median write rate, µ1 , called M T T F median. The second one is calculated using
the write rate of each individual word, called M T T F accurate. The errors introduced by
M T T F median over M T T F accurate were gathered from 1,000 sets of random write rates
and shown in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4 shows that when the write rates distribute in the range of the median write
rate ±10%, the errors are always less than 2% - in most cases, 1%. The error level is lower
than the first example where there are only 2 words, because the effects of fast write rates
and slow write rates can cancel each other out to some extent.
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Figure 6.4: Error Introduced by Using the Median Write Rate for the Entire Memory.
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In Figure 6.4, it is worth noting that the error introduced by using the median write
rate for the entire memory has a positive offset. This can be explained as follows. When
individual write rates are used, Equation 6.11 can be re-organized as:
M T T F accurate =

1
λ2 M N (N

− 1)

where H is the harmonic mean of write rates, and H = M/

· H,

PM

1
i=1 µi .

When the median write

rate µ1 is used, Equation 6.11 can be expressed as
M T T F median =

1
λ2 M N (N

− 1)

· µ1 .

(6.15)

For randomly generated write rates, µ1 should distribute evenly around the arithmetic mean
A without bias. Additionally, it can be proven that A ≥ H. Thus the distribution of
the errors of M T T F median over M T T F accurate has a positive offset. That means,
Equation 6.15 overestimates MTTF by giving optimistic results.
6.1.3

Analysis 2 - Impact of Write Rate on Reliability
With the knowledge from Section 6.1.2, it becomes possible to investigate the relia-

bility of a memory with multiple groups. In this subsection, the situation where two groups
with significantly different write rates is considered. In this case, each group has its own
write rate, being µ1 and µ2 , respectively, and µ1 is orders of magnitude greater than µ2 .
Group 1 has M1 words, and group 2 has M2 words. Thus Equation 6.10 becomes
MT T F =

1
λ2 N (N

µ1 µ2
.
− 1) M1 µ2 + M2 µ1
·

(6.16)

Figure 6.5 shows Equation 6.16 with M1 increasing and M1 + M2 being fixed at 100.
In addition, µ1 is four orders of magnitude greater than µ2 . The memory can reach its
highest possible MTTF when M1 = 100, and its lowest possible MTTF when M1 = 0. These
two bounds are marked by the two dotted lines in Figure 6.5. It is notable that as M1
increases, the improvement of memory reliability shows a non-linear characteristic. When
10% of the words belong to group 2, the MTTF of the memory is 105.2 years. When all the
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words are in group 1, the MTTF skyrockets to 108.2 years. This huge difference indicates
that having a small fraction of words with slow write rates can drastically hurt the reliability
of the memory.
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Figure 6.5: Reliability of a Memory with Two Groups

Figure 6.5 shows that the overall reliability of a memory is mainly determined by the
memory locations that have low write rates. Therefore it is crucial to improve the reliability
of these locations in order to protect the entire memory.
6.2

Proposed Model for Mixed Scrubbing
In the second model, both probabilistic scrubbing (write access) and deterministic

scrubbing are taken into account for memory protection.

78

6.2.1

Mathematical Expression
In the previous subsection, the reliability of a single word i with probabilistic scrub

rate µi was given:
α2
α1
e−α1 t +
e−α2 t ,
(6.17)
α2 − α1
α1 − α2
√
√
λ(2N −1)+µi − λ2 +2λµi (2N −1)+µ2i
λ(2N −1)+µi + λ2 +2λµi (2N −1)+µ2i
where α1 =
and α2 =
. Then the
2
2
ri (t) =

reliability of an M -word memory is

R(t) =

M
Y

ri (t).

(6.18)

i=1

When deterministic scrubbing is also taken into account, this reliability is valid before
the first deterministic scrub. We assume that the deterministic scrub rate is ν, and the
scrub interval T = 1/ν. After the memory is scrubbed at time T , it is considered error-free.
Therefore, the reliability of the memory at time nT (n is a positive integer) is the probability
that the memory has survived all n previous scrub intervals, which can be expressed as
Q(nT ) = Rn (T ).

(6.19)

Equation 6.19 has staircase characteristics which help the evaluation of the MTTF.
Figure 6.6 shows such characteristics. Since MTTF is the integral of the reliability function
over time, the area covered by the horizontal dotted lines in Figure 6.6 represents the lower
bound of the MTTF, and the area covered by the horizontal dotted lines plus the area
covered by the vertical dotted lines represents the upper bound.
Using the summation formula of geometric progression, we can get the upper bound
and lower bound of MTTF:
M T T Fu = T [1 + R(T ) + R2 (T ) + R3 (T ) + ...]
=

T
,
1 − R(T )
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(6.20)
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Figure 6.6: Variation of the Reliability with Both Types of Scrubbing with Time; Upper and
Lower Bound of MTTF

M T T Fl = T [R(T ) + R2 (T ) + R3 (T ) + ...]
=

(6.21)

T
− T.
1 − R(T )

In Equation 6.20 and Equation 6.21, R(T ) is the reliability of the memory at time T
when only probabilistic scrubbing is applied (can be calculated using Equation 6.18).
6.2.2

Analysis
Deterministic scrubbing can be applied when probabilistic scrubbing cannot provide

sufficient protection, and the mixed scrubbing model proposed by this dissertation includes
both types of scrubbing. In order to better understand the characteristics of the proposed
80
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Figure 6.7: MTTF Given by the Comprehensive Scrubbing Model for a Memory with Two
Different Access Rates.

model for mixed scrubbing, we consider a case where the memory has in total 100 words,
which can be divided into two groups. The first group has a write rate of 1, and the second
group has a write rate of 10−4 . The deterministic scrub rate is 0.01 for every location in the
memory. Figure 6.7 presents the MTTF of the entire memory when group 1 has different
number of words.
The lower dotted curve in Figure 6.7 shows the MTTF when only probabilistic scrubbing is considered (Equation 6.10), and the horizontal line shows the MTTF of deterministic
scrubbing. When all the words are in group 2, the memory has the lowest MTTF because
group 2 has a lower write rate. If deterministic scrubbing is combined with probabilistic
scrubbing, then the MTTF can be greatly elevated. From Figure 6.7 we can see that deterministic scrubbing provides a “base protection” for the memory and it helps the most when
most words have low write rates.
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From the discussion on the model for mixed scrubbing, we can conclude that deterministic scrubbing can improve the MTTF of the entire memory when part of the memory
is less frequently written than other parts, as long as the deterministic scrub rate is higher
than the lowest write rate of all the locations. In addition, if there are locations with write
rate of zero, then adding deterministic scrubbing is an effective way to provide a minimum
level of protection.
6.3

Validation of the Proposed Models
Two sets of Monte Carlo simulations were run to validate the proposed models. MAT-

LAB programs were written to simulate upsets in the memory as well as the scrubbing behavior of the memory. Figure 6.8 presents a flow chart of the MATLAB program used for the
proposed model for non-uniform probabilistic scrubbing. The program used for the proposed
model for mixed scrubbing is very similar to Figure 6.8, with only a few slight changes. The
key is to generate random scrubbing events and bit error events with their intervals being
exponentially distributed. When two errors show up in a single word, a failure of the memory occurs and the time to failure is recorded. After 100 iterations of such a simulation, the
mean time to failure is calculated and then compared to the theoretical value obtained by
the proposed models. It is shown that both proposed models give results within 3% of the
mean value of the simulated MTTFs.
Figure 6.9 shows the Monte Carlo simulation results for the proposed model with nonuniform probabilistic scrubbing. In this simulation, λ = 10−3 per second and µi randomly
distributes in the range of (100,200) per second. Therefore µi is five orders of magnitude
higher than λ and Equation 6.10 is valid. In Figure 6.9, the mean value of the simulation
results is 2.89 × 10−5 years, and the MTTF estimate given by Equation 6.10 is 2.86 × 10−5
years. The difference between the theoretical value and the simulated value is 1.03%.
Figure 6.10 presents the Monte Carlo simulation results for the proposed model with
mixed scrubbing. In this simulation, λ = 10−3 per second, µi randomly distributes in the
range of (100,200) per second, and the deterministic scrub interval is T = 0.02 (or, ν = 50).
In Figure 6.10, the mean value of the simulation results is 4.17 × 10−5 years, the MTTF of
the memory when only probabilistic scrubbing is considered is 2.82 × 10−5 years, the MTTF
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Figure 6.8: Flow Chart of the Monte Carlo Simulation.

of the memory when only deterministic scrubbing is considered is 1.97 × 10−5 years, and the
MTTF of mixed scrubbing is 4.25 × 10−5 years. Again, the estimate given by Equation 6.21
is very close to the mean value of the simulation results, with a difference of 2.08%.
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Figure 6.9: Comparison of Monte Carlo Simulation Results and the Proposed Model for Non-Uniform Probabilistic Scrubbing.
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of Monte Carlo Simulation Result and the Proposed Model for Mixed Scrubbing.

6.4

Summary
For most FPGA applications, the write distribution of memories is non-uniform.

Thus, the reliability model for FPGA memories has to take this fact into account when
modeling write operations as probabilistic scrubbing events. The proposed model for nonuniform probabilistic scrubbing is such a model. This model requires more parameters and
more understanding of the write access patterns to the memories compared to other models.
In addition, this model gives accurate results only if the write rate of each memory location
is orders of magnitude higher than the bit failure rate.
If deterministic scrubbing is involved as a mitigation techniques, then another proposed model, the model for mixed scrubbing, should be used. This model combines both
non-uniform probabilistic scrubbing and deterministic scrubbing, therefore it gives a more
accurate estimate than other models.
The analysis on the two models indicates that the overall reliability of a memory is
mainly determined by the memory locations that have low write rates. Thus it is crucial to
improve the reliability of these locations in order to protect the entire memory. For example,
if there are locations with write rate of zero, then employing deterministic scrubbing is an
effective way to proved a minimum level of protection.
At last, Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to validate the proposed models.
The simulation results show that the theoretical MTTF given by the models is within 3% of
the simulated MTTF.
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Chapter 7
Memory Access Patterns and Design Considerations of Reliable
Memory
With the MTTF equations derived in the previous chapter, we would like to obtain
an overall understanding of memory access patterns. With this knowledge, designers can be
more assured about the reliability of their circuits. There are two types of typical FPGA
applications: soft CPU cores and digital signal processing (DSP). Memory access patterns
and memory protection mechanisms are quite different for the two types of applications,
though.
FPGA-based soft CPU cores are implemented utilizing general-purpose FPGA logic
resources, and they are popular because compared to parallel algorithms, sequential algorithms that do not require huge processing power are easier to implement as a program for
a microprocessor [63]. There are a number of soft core processors for FPGAs. Some popular
ones are PicoBlaze [64] and MicroBlaze [65] for Xilinx devices, Nios II [66] for Altera devices,
and LEON3 [67].
In soft CPU core applications, BRAMs are used as either cache or memory. Cache is
usually significantly smaller than the memory use of an application, which means that the
locations in a cache are rewritten quite frequently and therefore there is generally no need
to scrub a cache. Even if it is necessary to do so, scrubbing is easy to implement: when
a parity error is detected in a cache location, the corresponding cache line is invalidated,
which forces the cache to reload the correct value from the memory. Meanwhile, the pipeline
should be stalled.
Memory is less overwritten than cache, and the memory access patterns may vary
significantly for different programs. Some FPGA-based soft CPU cores, such as MicroBlaze, provide software-supported scrubbing instruction. The scrubbing instruction performs
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scrubbing to all addresses in the memory and is intended to be called periodically from a
timer interrupt routine [65]. The scrub rate should be determined by analyzing the memory
access pattern of a particular application and using the proposed models.
In general, scrubbing is quite simple to implement for both cache and memory in
soft CPU core applications. For DSP applications, however, there is no software-supported
mechanism for doing so. Therefore, this chapter focuses more on analyzing memory access
patterns of DPS applications. The methodology and analysis can be applied for soft CPU
core applications as well. In Section 7.1, an example DSP application will be studied and
analyzed.
If a memory is never written, i.e., it is used as a ROM, then its MTTF will be very
short without deterministic scrubbing. For example, a 512 × 36 ROM with a bit failure
rate of 1.97 × 10−11 per second has an MTTF of only 0.18 years. Therefore, ROMs should
always be protected by deterministic scrubbing. For the rest of this dissertation, only those
memories with write accesses will be considered. In addition, the results are supposed to be
applied to SEC/DED memories.
7.1

FPGA Application: DSP Designs
FPGAs are an attractive technology for DSP applications because they are partic-

ularly suitable for parallel algorithm implementation. In [1], Lavin et al. described the
design of a Space-time Coded Telemetry Receiver (SCTR), which can solve the issue of data
dropouts due to the use of multiple transmit antennas. Figure 7.1 shows a block diagram of
this design.
The SCTR is spread over three Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGAs, named brik1, brik2, and
brik3, respectively [1]. The incoming receive signal is a composition of the two transmitted
signals. Once received, the signal is mixed down to 70 MHz and sampled with a 93.3 MHz
12-bit A/D converter. The A/D samples are fed to brik1 which down converts the sampled
signal to baseband and marks the frame boundaries in it. Brik2 estimates the symbol timing
and channel attenuation of both received signals and the carrier frequency offset. Brik3 is a
trellis detector, which detects the symbols in the signal and outputs the corresponding bits
as a 10 Mb/sec data stream.
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Figure 7.1: A Block Diagram of the 3-FPGA MIMO Receiver [1].

7.1.1

Experimental Environment
The SCTR was developed using Xilinx System Generator for DSP v8.1i. System

Generator functions as a Simulink-based library within Matlab, making it an advantageous
simulation environment for signal processing applications [1]. Figure 7.2 shows an overview
of brik1 in the development environment.
The Simulink environment within Matlab provides a flexible environment for development and simulation. Signals can be either stored in the Matlab workspace or to a file
on the hard disk. This greatly facilitates the process of monitoring memory access patterns.
By adding some basic library blocks (output gateway, enabled subsystem, and “save to file”
sink), a memory write operation recorder (marked by the rectangle in Figure 7.3) can be
created to record memory write addresses each time a write operation occurs.
7.1.2

Experimental Methodology
A Matlab .mat file was generated to simulate the output of the A/D converter in

Figure 7.1, and is then used as the input vector to brik1. The simulation of each brik design
ran independently, because each design resides in its own Simulink project. Intermediate
signals from a previous design were stored in files and then fed into the next one. Each
simulation ran for 1.5 × 106 cycles.
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Figure 7.2: An Overview of Brik1 in System Generator.

Figure 7.3: An Example of the Recorder for Memory Write Operations.

As shown in Figure 7.3, when the write enable signal is asserted, the write address,
along with the clock cycle stamp, will be written into a Matlab .mat file. Another Matlab
program is then created to count how many times each memory location was written to.
When the memory access patterns are collected, the MTTF of the BRAMs are calculated using Equation 6.10.
7.1.3

Experimental Results and Analysis

Brik1 After a 1.5 × 106 cycle simulation, the write access pattern to each BRAM in design
brik1 was collected and summarized by Table 7.1. The data width for all BRAMs is 18 bits,
and clock period is approximately 5ns.
In Table 7.1, the first column shows the modules in which the BRAMs work, and the
second column gives the BRAM depths. The “MIN µi ” and the “MAX µi ” columns present
the write rate (per second) of the least and the most written location in each block, respectively. The fifth column shows the MTTF of each BRAM, calculated using Equation 6.10.
The bit failure rate used for the calculation is λ = 1.97 × 10−11 failures per bit per second.
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Table 7.1: Write Operations to BRAMs in Brik1

BRAM
Use
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT
FFT buf
FFT buf
Section Adder
Section Adder
Section Adder
Section Adder
Section Adder

BRAM
Depth
512
256
128
64
512
256
128
64
512
256
128
64
512
256
128
64
1024
1024
512
512
512
512
512

Min.
µi
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104

Max.
µi
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
3.91 × 105
7.81 × 105
1.56 × 106
1.56 × 106
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104
8.68 × 104

MTTF
(years)
2.04 × 1014
8.15 × 1014
3.26 × 1015
1.30 × 1016
2.04 × 1014
8.15 × 1014
3.26 × 1015
1.30 × 1016
2.04 × 1014
8.15 × 1014
3.26 × 1015
1.30 × 1016
2.04 × 1014
8.15 × 1014
3.26 × 1015
1.30 × 1016
2.26 × 1013
2.26 × 1013
4.53 × 1013
4.53 × 1013
4.53 × 1013
4.53 × 1013
4.53 × 1013

In brik1, there are 23 BRAMs and 8,448 words in total. The results of brik1 show that
all locations in the same BRAM have the same write rate. This means that every memory
location has been written evenly. In addition, all words are written frequently, leading to
considerably high write rates. Therefore, these BRAMs are well protected by their high
write rates.
When considering the overall MTTF of all the BRAMs on brik1, each single BRAM
can be seen as an entity with its own failure rate. Thus the MTTF of all the BRAMs on
brik1 is:

M T T Foverall = PP

1

1
i=1 M T T Fi
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,

(7.1)

where P is the total number of BRAMs. Given the data from Table 7.1, the MTTF of the
memory on brik1 is 4.05 × 1012 years.
Brik2 The write access pattern of each BRAM in brik2 was collected and summarized
by Table 7.2. 18 BRAMs and 5,664 words are utilized by three modules: the frequency
estimator, the pilot buffer, and the metric compute.

Table 7.2: Write Operations to BRAMs in Brik2

BRAM
Use
Frequency Est.
Frequency Est.
Frequency Est.
Frequency Est.
Frequency Est.
Frequency Est.
Pilot Buffer
Pilot Buffer
Pilot Buffer
Pilot Buffer
Metric Compute
Metric Compute
Metric Compute
Metric Compute
Metric Compute
Metric Compute
Metric Compute
Metric Compute

BRAM
Depth
32
512
512
512
512
512
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256

Min.
µi
0
0
800
667
667
667
2.8 × 103
2.8 × 103
2.8 × 103
2.8 × 103
1.96 × 105
1.96 × 105
1.96 × 105
1.96 × 105
1.96 × 105
1.96 × 105
1.96 × 105
1.96 × 105

Max.
µi
5.6 × 103
2.8 × 103
800
667
667
667
2.8 × 103
2.8 × 103
2.8 × 103
2.8 × 103
3.92 × 105
3.92 × 105
3.92 × 105
3.92 × 105
3.92 × 105
3.92 × 105
3.92 × 105
3.92 × 105

MTTF
(years)
< 112.08*
< 33.79*
4.17 × 1011
3.48 × 1011
3.48 × 1011
3.48 × 1011
2.92 × 1012
2.92 × 1012
2.92 × 1012
2.92 × 1012
2.04 × 1014
2.04 × 1014
2.04 × 1014
2.04 × 1014
2.04 × 1014
2.04 × 1014
2.04 × 1014
2.04 × 1014

* The MTTF of this BRAM is calculated using the equation for
SEC/DED memories without scrubbing [10].

Two BRAMs in the frequency estimator have some locations that are never written,
which greatly jeopardizes the memory reliability. In the BRAM in row 1 of Table 7.2, one
location was never written, one location was written 42 times, and the other 30 locations
were all written 21 times. In the BRAM in row 2, 11 locations were never written, and the
other 501 locations were all written 21 times. Although the percentage of the locations that
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never got written is very small, they drastically reduce the MTTF of these two BRAMs.
Because Equation 6.10 is not accurate when µi = 0, the MTTF of these two BRAMs is
calculated using the model for SEC/DED memories without scrubbing [10]:
1
MT T F =
λN

r

π
.
2M

The remaining BRAMs in brik2 have variant write rates, but even the least frequently written
words have a write rate of 667 times per second. Thus the MTTF of these BRAMs are quite
long, ranging from 1011 years to 1014 years.
It is difficult to calculate the precise MTTF of all the BRAMs on brik2 when considering them as an entity, but we know from Equation 7.1 that the overall MTTF must be
shorter than the MTTF of the most unreliable component. Thus the MTTF of the BRAMs
on brik2 is shorter than 33.79 years (the MTTF of the BRAM in the second row of Table 7.2).
The low MTTF is caused by the few locations that are never written to. This confirms the
discussion in Section 6.1.3 that the words with low write rate can drastically reduce the
MTTF of the entire memory system. If the 12 words can be somehow excluded from the
memory, then the MTTF will be elevated to 8.05 × 1010 years. The discussion in Section
6.2 tells us that adding a deterministic scrubbing circuit to the corresponding BRAMs can
significantly improve the overall MTTF. The scrub rate can be set to the same as the lowest
write rate of other BRAMs, because the overall MTTF will always be limited by the lowest
write rate.
Brik3 The write access pattern to each BRAM in brik3 was collected and summarized by
Table 7.3. Brik3 has 32 BRAMs and 2,752 words, all of which are used by the trellis decoder
which performs the Viterbi Algorithm [68]. In brik3, the trellis decoder is broken up into
multiple processing elements (PEs) in order to enable a systolic array based implementation
[1]. This systolic array shows very regular write accesses. In different PEs, different BRAM
sizes are required.
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From Table 7.3 we can see that the number of write accesses is uniform for every
BRAM and every location in brik3. This is because all PEs do the same amount of decoding
work. Consequently, larger BRAMs have a shorter MTTF than the smaller ones.

Table 7.3: Write Operations to BRAMs in Brik3

BRAM
BRAM
Use
Depth
Trellis Decoder
16
Trellis Decoder
16
Trellis Decoder
16
Trellis Decoder
16
Trellis Decoder
32
Trellis Decoder
32
Trellis Decoder
32
Trellis Decoder
32
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
64
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128
Trellis Decoder
128

Min.
µi
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
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Max.
µi
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103
2.67 × 103

MTTF
(years)
4.45 × 1013
4.45 × 1013
4.45 × 1013
4.45 × 1013
2.23 × 1013
2.23 × 1013
2.23 × 1013
2.23 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
1.11 × 1013
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012
5.56 × 1012

Using Equation 7.1, the BRAMs on brik3 have an overall MTTF of 2.59 × 1011 years.
7.1.4

Conclusion
From the results gathered from the simulation, we can conclude that most BRAMs

in the SCTR design have considerably long MTTFs. This is because of the character of
DSP applications: data streams in and out frequently, leading to relatively frequent write
and read operations to the BRAMs. Thus, for the BRAMs that have write accesses, it is
not necessary to employ extra deterministic scrubbing. However, this experiment also shows
how severely the words with low write rate can hurt the overall reliability of the memory.
Therefore, memories which have words with very low or zero write rate must be protected.
Several potential solutions could be used to improve the MTTF of the entire memory.
First, a deterministic scrubber could be employed to periodically scrub the BRAM which
contains locations with no write access to compensate for their zero write rate. Alternatively,
the designer could modify the memory controller to enable it to perform read-and-write
operations to the never written locations when the memory is in an idle state. Another
possible solution is replacing these locations with triplicated registers if there are only a few
such locations. In general, designers can select the most convenient and effective method
based on the reliability requirement of the circuit.
7.2

Design Considerations for Reliable Memory
In Chapter 6, the proposed models were analyzed to indicate the impact of write rate

on memory reliability and the effect of deterministic scrubbing to the overall reliability. In
Section 7.1, a real life DSP design was studied to reveal the memory access patterns (write
rates of each single word) in FPGA applications. Based on this knowledge, we would like
to provide a discussion on how to design a reliable memory. This section will try to answer
two questions:
1. Does a memory need deterministic scrubbing?
2. If yes, how often?
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7.2.1

Determining Need for Scrubbing
In Chapter 6, the analysis of the proposed model for probabilistic write scrubbing has

indicated that having a small fraction of words with low write rates can drastically hurt the
overall reliability of the memory. If probabilistic write scrubbing is insufficient to protect the
memory, then extra mitigation techniques such as deterministic scrubbing should be applied.
In order to estimate the memory reliability using the proposed model for probabilistic write
scrubbing, it is crucial to obtain the memory access pattern of the memory first. It is
convenient to gather such information by running simulations on the target design.
Section 7.1 has shown an example of how this can be done. In this example, an extra
module was created for each BRAM with the purpose of recording the address of each write
operation. This module was built under the environment of Simulink and then attached to
each BRAM.
Reliability Metrics: MTTF and Mission Time
With the knowledge of the memory write rates of a specific design, the proposed model
for probabilistic write scrubbing can be used to estimate its MTTF. However, MTTF is not a
good metric for estimating the probability of successful operation in a given amount of time.
MTTF gives the average failure time assuming a large deployment number. In addition,
MTTF is also a good metric for general comparisons of different reliability techniques. On
the other hand, the mission time function, M T (r), gives the time before which system
reliability is above or equal to a given level r [12]. Therefore mission time is ideal for
estimating the reliability of a specific design, that is, when the deployment number is 1.
The relation between the reliability function, R(t), and the mission time function,
M T (r), is given by the following equations:
R[M T (r)] = r,

(7.2)

M T [R(t)] = t.

(7.3)
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If the system has a constant failure rate λ, then its mission time is easily shown to be
M T (r) =

− ln r
.
λ

(7.4)

With the mission time function, designers can pick a target reliability, and calculate the time
before which the target reliability can be guaranteed.
The mission time function can be used to address the question: given the memory
access pattern, how to decide if extra deterministic scrubbing is needed for a memory?
Consider the BRAMs listed in Table 7.2 as an example. The BRAM on the second row
has 11 words that are never written and their probabilistic scrubbing rates are zero. In
this case, the proposed model for probabilistic write scrubbing is not accurate, therefore the
reliability of these 11 words are calculated using the model for SEC/DED memory without
scrubbing [10]:
R(t) = [e−λN t · (N · eλt − N + 1)]M .

(7.5)

If we would like to derive the mission time function from the above equation, then
we have to solve the equation for t. Obviously it is very difficult. But we can plug into
Equation 7.5 different values of t and observe when R(t) drops below a given level r. We
assume that λ = 4 × 10−10 per second and r = 99.9%. Then we plug into the equation a
series of increasing t values, with the interval being 0.001 year. The result shows that R(t)
will be above or equal to 99.9% when t is less than 0.062 years, or 22.63 days. Therefore,
the mission time for r = 99.9% is approximately 22.63 days. Obviously this mission time
is unacceptable and extra reliability techniques such as deterministic scrubbing should be
applied.
This approach can be applied to any memory as long as the memory write rates are
known. After the approximated mission time is calculated, whether or not deterministic
scrubbing is necessary can be decided based on the mission requirement.
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7.2.2

Determining the Scrub Rate

Determining the Scrub Rate for ROMs
At the beginning of this Chapter, it is stated that ROMs should always be protected
by deterministic scrubbing. Here we will present an example of how to determine the scrub
rate for ROMs to meet the requirement of mission time.
Consider the following example: a ROM has 512 words and 18 bits in each word
(M = 512, N = 18). The ROM is protected by SEC/DED only, and has no write operations.
We assume the bit failure rate λ = 4 × 10−10 per second and the ROM is expected to
operate without failures with a probability r = 99.9% for 1 year. The reliability function for
SEC/DED memory with deterministic scrubbing, D(t), is given by [10]:

D(t) = Rbt/T c (T ) · R(t − bt/T c T ),

(7.6)

where T is the scrub interval, and R(t) is given by Equation 7.5. Now we know that t = 1
year, what we need to calculate is the largest value of T that satisfies R(t) ≥ r. Again, it is
very difficult to solve Equation 7.6 for T . Therefore we created a MATLAB program to plug
into Equation 7.6 a series of increasing T values, with the interval being 1 second. Then the
program reports the largest possible T value that meets the requirement of mission time.
The T value reported by the program is 2532 seconds, or 42.2 minutes. That means
every word must be scrubbed at least once every 42 minutes in order for the ROM to operate
without failures with a probability of 99.9% for 1 year.
Table 7.4 summarizes the required deterministic scrub intervals for this particular
ROM with various target reliability for a year. The third column presents the MTTF of the
ROM under each different scrub interval.
Determining the Scrub Rate for RAMs
For RAMs, the process of determining the deterministic scrub rate is almost the same
as the process for ROMs. The only difference between the two is the reliability functions
involved in the two processes are different. The following example will show how to determine
the deterministic scrub rate for a RAM, of which the memory write rates are already known.
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Table 7.4: Required Scrub Interval for Various Target Reliability for a Year

Target Reliability
for a Year
90%
99%
99.9%
99.99%
99.999%
99.9999%

Required Scrub Interval MTTF for the Scrub
(Seconds)
Interval (Years)
267,064 (3.09 days)
8.95
25,432 (7.06 hours)
93.95
2532 (42.2 minutes)
943.68
253 (4.23 minutes)
9.44 × 103
25
9.56 × 104
3.4
7.03 × 105

We will take as an example the BRAM shown in the second row of Table 7.2. All
the other parameters are the same as the above ROM example. The reliability function of
mixed scrubbing, Q(t), was given by Equation 6.19, and we present it again here:
Q(t) = Rbt/T c (T ) · R(t − bt/T c T ),

(7.7)

where T is the deterministic scrub interval, and R(t) is the reliability of the memory when
only probabilistic write scrubbing is applied (given by Equation 6.18).
Similar to the ROM example, a MATLAB program was created to plug into Equation 7.7 a series of increasing T values with the interval being 1 second. The result reported
by the program was 117976 seconds, or 1.37 days. This means every memory location must
be scrubbed at least once every 1.37 days in order for the BRAM to operate without failures
with a probability of 99.9% for 1 year.
In the example above, 11 words have a write rate of 0 and significantly hurt the
overall reliability of the BRAM. Next we will consider an example in which all the words
are frequently overwritten. The BRAM shown in the third row of Table 7.2 has a uniform
write rate of 800 per second for all of its locations. Even without deterministic scrubbing,
this BRAM has a mission time of 8.24 × 109 years when r = 99.9%. Therefore, this BRAM
does not need deterministic scrubbing at all.
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7.2.3

Deterministic Scrubbing: More Considerations
The biggest advantage of deterministic scrubbing is that it is very effective in en-

hancing the overall reliability of memories, which has been demonstrated in Section 6.2.
The first example in the previous subsection shows that deterministic scrubbing is definitely
necessary for ROMs. It is crucial to protect ROMs by scrubbing because they do not have
write operations.
The second example shows that for RAMs which have words with low or zero write
rates, deterministic scrubbing can provide satisfactory protection. An approximated scrub
rate can be obtained with given mission time t and target reliability r. In this particular
example, the scrub rate is once every 1.37 days, therefore deterministic scrubbing may be
replaced by rebooting if rebooting the system every day is acceptable by the mission. This
can save the logic resources and the memory port taken by the scrubber. However, if a much
higher scrub rate is required, the scrubber should be kept.
The third example shows that some BRAMs do not need to be scrubbed as long as
all of their memory locations are frequently written. This decision should be made after
estimating the BRAM’s mission time without deterministic scrubbing.
7.3

Summary
This chapter discussed the memory access patterns of a typical FPGA application —

DSP. The analysis of the reliability models derived in Chapter 6 indicates that scrubbing
is only necessary if a memory or part of the memory is seldom rewritten. Therefore, with
the knowledge of memory access patterns, designers will be able to better understand the
reliability of the memory in their circuits.
Generally speaking, BRAMs in DSP designs do not need to be scrubbed because they
are frequently overwritten due to data streaming, a characteristic of DSP applications. For
those seldom written locations revealed by the memory access pattern, however, protecting
mechanisms such as scrubbing or triplication are required to maintain the overall reliability
of the entire memory. Similarly, registers and cache in FPGA-based soft core processors
do not require scrubbing because the contents in these memory locations are frequently
replaced. The main memory of a soft core may have different memory access patterns for
101

different applications, thus whether the memory should be scrubbed is an application-specific
problem.
The last section focuses on providing a guide on how to use the proposed models to
help make design decisions for reliable memory systems. With the knowledge of memory
access patterns, a designer will be able to estimate the mission time of the memory and then
make the decision of whether or not employ deterministic scrubbing to further enhance its
reliability. If the answer is yes, then proper deterministic scrub rates can be decided using
the proposed model for mixed scrubbing.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1

Summary of Contributions
The following is a summary of the research presented in this dissertation and its major

contributions:
Chapter 1 provided introduction and motivation for this research. It pointed out the
effect of SEUs on FPGAs and the importance of mitigation techniques. Among the fields
where these mitigation techniques may be employed, this dissertation focuses on reliable
information communication and storage in FPGA circuits.
Chapter 2 gave a background introduction of radiation effects on FPGA circuits and
mitigation techniques used to protect electronic devices in space. TMR has been proved
to be the most effective mitigation technique for FPGA circuits. In addition, this chapter
introduced the criteria and methods for evaluating circuit reliability.
Chapter 3 pointed out that TMR circuits with clock domain crossing have several
problems that may lead to unreliable information communication. First it was confirmed
that although meta-stability is inevitable when sampling asynchronous signals, it can be
ignored as long as appropriate synchronizer designs are used. Second, asynchronous sampling
uncertainty occurs because of signal skew, the difference of wire delays in the triplicated
circuit. When asynchronous sampling uncertainty and SEU occur simultaneously at the
same place, the synchronizer will fail. Chapter 3 then gave the timing constraint on minimum
signal pulse width which can avoid failures due to signal skew.
Chapter 4 considered different types of TMR synchronizers based on the length of the
sent signals. For signals whose pulse width is longer than the clock period of the receiving
clock domain, no special synchronizer is needed as long as the timing constraint discussed
in Chapter 3 is met. On the other hand, for signals that are shorter than the clock period
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of the receiving clock domain, a new synchronizer was proposed to ensure their reliable
transmission.
Chapter 4 then analyzed the functional correctness of the proposed synchronizer
for short pulses. Fault injection testing was conducted to demonstrate the performance
of the synchronizers for both long and short signals. In addition, Chapter 4 calculated the
MTTF of the correctly mitigated synchronizers and compared them against simple triplicated
(unprotected) synchronizers. The results showed that correctly mitigated synchronizers have
between 6 and 10 orders of magnitude longer MTTFs than simple triplicated synchronizers.
In the field of information storage in FPGAs, SEC/DED codes with scrubbing is
a commonly used technique. Chapter 5 discussed several existing models which provide
MTTF estimates for such memory systems. Scrubbing can be divided into two categories:
deterministic scrubbing and probabilistic scrubbing. Deterministic scrubbing employs a dedicated scrubber to regularly refresh the contents of every memory location. On the other
hand, probabilistic scrubbing occurs whenever a memory location is accessed (either read or
written) and therefore does not require a scrubber.
This dissertation pays attention to probabilistic write scrubbing because it comes
completely for free — that is, no extra circuit or performance overhead is required. In
addition, the probabilistic scrub rate of each memory location is usually different as write
operations are not uniformly distributed over the memory. The previously published models
discussed and compared in Chapter 5 either assumed uniform probabilistic scrub rate or
considered deterministic scrubbing only, none of which is realistic for FPGA applications.
Therefore, two new reliability models were created and derived in Chapter 6.
The first proposed model is for SEC/DED memories with only probabilistic scrubbing, and the scrub rate is assumed to be non-uniform. Compared to previous models,
the proposed model for non-uniform probabilistic scrubbing requires more parameters and
more understanding of the write access patterns to the memories. In addition, this model
gives accurate results only if the write rate of each memory location is orders of magnitude
higher than the bit failure rate. The second proposed model is for SEC/DED memories with
both probabilistic and deterministic scrubbing. This model is named the “comprehensive
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scrubbing” model, and combines both non-uniform probabilistic scrubbing and deterministic
scrubbing.
Chapter 6 then analyzed both models. The analysis indicated that the overall reliability of a memory was mainly determined by the memory locations that had low write rates.
Thus it is crucial to improve the reliability of these locations in order to protect the entire
memory. Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to validate the proposed
models. The simulation results showed that the theoretical MTTF given by the models is
within 3% of the simulated MTTF.
Chapter 7 discussed the memory access patterns of two types of FPGA applications
— DSP and soft CPU cores. The analysis of the reliability models derived in Chapter 6
indicates that scrubbing is necessary if a memory or part of the memory is seldom rewritten.
Therefore, with the knowledge of memory access patterns, designers will be able to better
understand the reliability of the memory in their circuits. Generally speaking, memories
in DSP designs do not need to be scrubbed because they are frequently overwritten due
to data streaming. Similarly, registers and cache in FPGA-based soft cores do not require
scrubbing because the contents in these memory locations are frequently replaced. The main
memory of a soft core may have different memory access patterns for different applications,
thus whether the memory should be scrubbed is an application-specific problem.
At last, Chapter 7 intended on providing a guide on how to use the proposed models
to help make design decisions for reliable memory systems. With the knowledge of memory
access patterns, a designer will be able to estimate the mission time of the memory and then
make the decision of whether or not to employ deterministic scrubbing to further enhance its
reliability. If the answer is yes, then proper deterministic scrub rates can be decided using
the proposed model for mixed scrubbing.
8.2

Future Work
This dissertation discussed why the proposed mathematical models provided more

accurate MTTF estimates than previous models. There is work that can still be done to
further demonstrate the accuracy of the proposed models. An example of future work is
suggested here:
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Beam test for the two proposed models Although the proposed models were validated
using MATLAB-based Monte Carlo simulations, beam tests can further demonstrate their
correctness. In a beam test, the circuit to be tested is placed into particle radiation such as
heavy ions to gather data. This would be a better simulation for the space environment than
software simulation and therefore can provide more confidence about the proposed models.
8.3

Concluding Remarks
With FPGAs being widely used in space applications, SEU mitigation techniques for

these devices are increasingly important. Although TMR has been proved to be the most
effective mitigation technique against SEU, it has two problems when applied to FPGA circuits. First, TMR still can fail when a triplicated circuit crosses asynchronous clock domains.
Second, its huge cost makes it less favorable than other alternatives for some structures such
as memory. By investigating these problems, this dissertation aims at improving the reliability of FPGA circuits in harsh environments. The work can be divided into two parts:
reliable information communication and reliable information storage.
In the part of reliable information communication, the combined effect of asynchronous sampling uncertainty and SEU was analyzed, and new synchronizer designs were
proposed for safe transmission of signals across asynchronous clock domains. The proposed
synchronizer designs provide excellent mitigation by considering both long and short signal
pulses.
In the second part, reliable information storage, previous reliability models for SEC/DED
memories with scrubbing were discussed and compared, and two new models were derived
based on the characteristics of FPGA applications. The proposed models indicate that memory locations that are frequently overwritten tend to be reliable while locations that have
rare write access may need extra protection in order to maintain the overall reliability of
the entire memory. Therefore it would greatly help the designers if they know the memory
access patterns of their designs.
Soft CPU core and DSP are two common uses of FPGAs. In soft CPU cores, cache
generally does not need to be scrubbed because they are frequently overwritten. The use of
main memory varies for different applications, therefore whether the memory needs scrub106

bing should be decided after getting the memory access pattern of a specific application.
In general, soft CPU cores provide software-supported scrubbing instructions for cache or
memory, making scrubbing easy to implement. A DSP application was investigated as a
case of study, and experiments showed that in DSP applications, most memory locations are
frequently rewritten and do not require scrubbing. But it is possible that just a few memory locations with zero write rate exist in the memory and jeopardize the overall reliability.
Memory access patterns can reveal such memory locations and corresponding protection
should be applied.
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Appendix A
VHDL Design of a Deterministic Scrubber
This appendix provides the VHDL code of the example deterministic scrubber discussed in Section 2.2.4.
1

library IEEE;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL;
use IEEE.NUMERIC_STD.ALL;

library UNISIM;
6

use UNISIM.VComponents.all;

entity scrubber is
generic(
DEPTH : natural :=
SCRUB_INTERVAL

11

1024;

: natural := 100

-- Number of words
-- Scrub interval (clock cycles)

);
port(

16

clk

: in std_logic;

rst

: in std_logic;

addr

: in std_logic_vector(9 downto 0);

we

: in std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);

en

: in std_logic;

data_in : in std_logic_vector(35 downto 0);
data_out
21

: out std_logic_vector(35 downto 0)

);
end scrubber;
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architecture Behavioral of scrubber is
function log2c(n: integer) return integer is
26

variable m, p: integer;
begin
m := 0;
p := 1;
while p < n loop
m := m + 1;

31

p := p * 2;
end loop;
return m;
end log2c;
36

-- Signals
type state_type is (IDLE, RD_WAIT, RD, WR_WAIT, WR);
signal state_reg, state_next

: state_type;

signal DOA, DOB : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal DOPA, DOPB : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
41

signal ADDRA, ADDRB : std_logic_vector(15 downto 0);
signal DIA, DIB : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal DIPA, DIPB : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
signal ENA, ENB : std_logic;
signal WEA, WEB : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);

46

signal scrubber_we

: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);

signal scrubber_en

: std_logic;

signal scrubber_data

: std_logic_vector(35 downto 0);

signal scrubber_addr_cnt

: unsigned(log2c(DEPTH)-1 downto 0);

signal scrubber_int_cnt

: unsigned(log2c(SCRUB_INTERVAL)-1 downto 0);

51

begin

-- RAMB36: 32k+4k Parity Paramatizable True Dual-Port BlockRAM
-- Virtex-5
56

-- Xilinx HDL Libraries Guide, version 11.2

115

-- Port A: normal BRAM operation
-- Port B: scrubber
RAMB36_inst : RAMB36
generic map (
DOA_REG => 0, -- Optional output register on A port (0 or 1)

61

DOB_REG => 0, -- Optional output register on B port (0 or 1)
INIT_A => X"000000000", -- Initial values on A output port
INIT_B => X"000000000", -- Initial values on B output port
RAM_EXTENSION_A => "NONE", -- "UPPER", "LOWER" or "NONE" when cascaded
RAM_EXTENSION_B => "NONE", -- "UPPER", "LOWER" or "NONE" when cascaded

66

READ_WIDTH_A => 36, -- Valid values are 1, 2, 4, 9, 18, or 36
READ_WIDTH_B => 36, -- Valid values are 1, 2, 4, 9, 18, or 36
SIM_COLLISION_CHECK => "ALL", -- Collision check enable "ALL", "
WARNING_ONLY",
-- "GENERATE_X_ONLY" or "NONE"
SIM_MODE => "SAFE", -- Simulation: "SAFE" vs "FAST", see "Synthesis and
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Simulation
-- Design Guide" for details
SRVAL_A => X"000000000", -- Set/Reset value for A port output
SRVAL_B => X"000000000", -- Set/Reset value for B port output
WRITE_MODE_A => "WRITE_FIRST", -- "WRITE_FIRST", "READ_FIRST" or "
NO_CHANGE"
WRITE_MODE_B => "WRITE_FIRST", -- "WRITE_FIRST", "READ_FIRST" or "
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NO_CHANGE"
WRITE_WIDTH_A => 36, -- Valid values are 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 18, 36
WRITE_WIDTH_B => 36, -- Valid values are 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 18, 36
-- The following INIT_xx declarations specify the initial contents of the
RAM
-- Initial contents are all 0s, omitted here
81

)
port map (
CASCADEOUTLATA => open, -- 1-bit cascade A latch output
CASCADEOUTLATB => open, -- 1-bit cascade B latch output
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CASCADEOUTREGA => open, -- 1-bit cascade A register output
CASCADEOUTREGB => open, -- 1-bit cascade B register output

86

DOA => DOA, -- 32-bit A port data output
DOB => DOB, -- 32-bit B port data output
DOPA => DOPA, -- 4-bit A port parity data output
DOPB => DOPB, -- 4-bit B port parity data output
ADDRA => ADDRA, -- 16-bit A port address input
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ADDRB => ADDRB, -- 16-bit B port address input
CASCADEINLATA => ’0’, -- 1-bit cascade A latch input
CASCADEINLATB => ’0’, -- 1-bit cascade B latch input
CASCADEINREGA => ’0’, -- 1-bit cascade A register input
CASCADEINREGB => ’0’, -- 1-bit cascade B register input
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CLKA => clk, -- 1-bit A port clock input
CLKB => clk, -- 1 bit B port clock input
DIA => DIA, -- 32-bit A port data input
DIB => DIB, -- 32-bit B port data input
DIPA => DIPA, -- 4-bit A port parity data input
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DIPB => DIPB, -- 4-bit B port parity data input
ENA => ENA, -- 1-bit A port enable input
ENB => ENB, -- 1-bit B port enable input
REGCEA => ’0’, -- 1-bit A port register enable input
REGCEB => ’0’, -- 1-bit B port register enable input
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SSRA => rst, -- 1-bit A port set/reset input
SSRB => rst, -- 1-bit B port set/reset input
WEA => WEA, -- 4-bit A port write enable input
WEB => WEB -- 4-bit B port write enable input
111

);
-- End of RAMB36_inst instantiation

-- Signal assignments for BRAM signals
data_out(31 downto 0) <= DOA;
116

data_out(35 downto 32)

<= DOPA;

scrubber_data(31 downto 0)

<= DOB;
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scrubber_data(35 downto 32) <= DOPB;
ADDRA(14 downto 5)

<= addr;

ADDRA(15) <= ’0’;
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ADDRA(4 downto 0) <= (others => ’0’);
ADDRB(14 downto 5)

<= std_logic_vector(scrubber_addr_cnt);

ADDRB(15) <= ’0’;
ADDRB(4 downto 0) <= (others => ’0’);
DIA <= data_in(31 downto 0);
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DIPA

<= data_in(35 downto 32);

DIB <= scrubber_data(31 downto 0);
DIPB

<= scrubber_data(35 downto 32);

ENA <= en;
ENB <= scrubber_en;
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WEA <= we;
WEB <= scrubber_we;

-- Counter for the Scrubber
process(rst, clk)
136

begin
if(rst = ’1’) then
scrubber_addr_cnt <= (others => ’0’);
scrubber_int_cnt

<=(others => ’0’);

elsif(clk’event and clk = ’1’) then
141

if(scrubber_int_cnt = SCRUB_INTERVAL-1) then
scrubber_addr_cnt <= scrubber_addr_cnt + 1;
end if;
if(scrubber_int_cnt = SCRUB_INTERVAL-1) then
scrubber_int_cnt
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<= (others => ’0’);

else
scrubber_int_cnt

<= scrubber_int_cnt + 1;

end if;
end if;
end process;
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-- Register for the scrubber
process(rst, clk)
begin
if(rst = ’1’) then
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state_reg <= IDLE;
elsif(clk’event and clk = ’1’) then
state_reg <= state_next;
end if;
end process;
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-- FSM for the scrubber
process(state_reg, scrubber_int_cnt, addr, we, en, scrubber_addr_cnt)
begin
state_next <= state_reg;
166

scrubber_en <= ’0’;
scrubber_we <= (others => ’0’);
case state_reg is
when IDLE =>
if(scrubber_int_cnt = 0) then
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state_next <= RD_WAIT;
end if;
when RD_WAIT

=>

-- Do not read from port B when a write operation is performed on port A
if(unsigned(addr) = scrubber_addr_cnt and en = ’1’ and we = "1111")
then
176

state_next <= RD_WAIT;
else
state_next <= RD;
end if;
-- Read from port B
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when RD =>
state_next <= WR_WAIT;
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scrubber_en <= ’1’;
-- Do not write to port B when port A is being read or written
when WR_WAIT =>
186

if(unsigned(addr) = scrubber_addr_cnt and en = ’1’) then
state_next <= WR_WAIT;
else
state_next <= WR;
end if;
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-- Write to port B
when WR =>
state_next <= IDLE;
scrubber_en <= ’1’;
scrubber_we <= "1111";
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end case;
end process;

end Behavioral;
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Appendix B
Derivation of Various Reliability Models
This appendix will present the derivation of the various reliability models for SEC/DED
memories that are discussed in this dissertation. The purpose of this appendix is to allow
readers to go through the derivation in more details so that they can be more aware of the
differences between the models.
B.1

Saleh’s Probabilistic Model
Saleh’s probabilistic model is proposed for cache memory of which the probabilistic

scrubbing interval can be enforced by the operation system. The original derivation was
presented in [10]. This model is based on four assumptions:
• Transient faults occur with the Poisson distribution.
• All the bit flips are statistically independent.
• A second bit flip in a single word does not correct the first one.
• Every word is considered as an entity with error rate λN , where λ is the bit failure
rate, and N is the number of bits in a single word.
Similar to the model for probabilistic scrubbing proposed by this dissertation, Saleh’s
probabilistic model also starts with a Markov model which describes the recovery behavior
of a single word, as shown in Figure B.1.
In Figure B.1, µ is the probabilistic scrub rate and is assumed to be the same for all
memory locations. The fourth assumption listed above indicates that the rates of the first
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Figure B.1: State Transition Rate Diagram for Saleh’s Probabilistic Model.

and the second errors in a word are not distinguished, and this is reflected in Figure B.1 in
that the arc pointing from state 0 to state 1 and the arc pointing from state 1 to state 2
have the same transition rate. This will have a slight impact on the accuracy of the result.
From Figure B.1 we can write the following transition matrix:




λN
0 
 −λN


 µ
−λN − µ λN 

.


0
0
0
By using the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, the following set of differential equations can be obtained to represent the dynamics of the probability system:
dp0 (t)
= −λN p0 (t) + µp1 (t),
dt
dp1 (t)
= λN p0 (t) − (λN + µ)p1 (t),
dt
dp2 (t)
= λN p1 (t).
dt

(B.1)

The following derivation is similar to the process presented in Section 6.1 and will be
skipped. The reliability of one word is:

r(t) =

α1
α2
e−α2 t +
e−α1 t ,
α1 − α2
α2 − α1

√
where α1 =

µ2 +4µλN

µ+2λN +
2

and α2 =

µ+2λN −

√

µ2 +4µλN

2
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.

(B.2)

The reliability of a memory system with M words is:

R(t) = [r(t)]M .

(B.3)

The MTTF of this memory is:
Z
MT T F =
0

∞



α1
α2
e−α2 t +
e−α1 t
α1 − α2
α2 − α1

M
dt.

(B.4)

This integration can be obtained by integration by parts. Then the boundary values of the
MTTF is given by:
1
< MT T F <
M α2



α1
α1 − α2

M
·

1
.
M α2

(B.5)

The lower boundary value can be simplified by using the serial expansion of square root
function in α2 :
s
"
#
µ
2λN
4λN
α2 =
1+
− 1+
2
µ
µ
#
"

2
3
λN
λN
−2
+ ... .
=µ
µ
µ

(B.6)

When λN/µ  1, the expansion can be carried only to the quadratic term to get an approximation for the lower bound:
MT T F =

µ
.
M λ2 N 2

(B.7)

In the derivation, two simplifications can introduce error to the final result. The first
one is that the failure rate of the second bit error in a word is λN . This simplification
slightly overestimate the failure rate and makes the reliability function and MTTF more
conservative. The second simplification is based on the observation that λN/µ should be
orders of magnitude less than 1. This approach also makes the results more conservative.
When λN/µ  1 does not hold, the reliability function and MTTF will become invalid.
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B.2

Saleh’s Deterministic Model
Saleh’s deterministic model provides reliability function and MTTF estimates for

SEC/DED memory with deterministic scrubbing. It follows the same assumptions as Saleh’s
probabilistic model. The derivation begins with deriving the reliability of a single word with
N bits. The reliability equals the sum of the probability that all bits are correct and the
probability that only one bit is faulty in the time interval (0, t):

r0 (t) = e−λN t + N (1 − e−λt )e−λ(N −1)t .

(B.8)

This reliability is valid until the first scrub event at time T . After each scrubbing, the
word is considered error-free and has a fresh start in the second scrubbing interval. Therefore,
the reliability of a SEC/DED word with deterministic scrubbing is the probability that it has
survived all previous scrubbing intervals times the probability of surviving the extra time
into the present scrubbing interval:

r(t) = [r0 (T )]bt/T c · r0 (t − bt/T c · t).

(B.9)

Then the reliability of the entire memory with M words is:

R(t) = [r(t)]M .

(B.10)

The equation above has staircase characteristics as shown in Figure 6.6 and can help in the
evaluation of the MTTF. By using the summation formula for geometric progression, the
lower and upper bounds of the MTTF are:
T
T
< MT T F <
.
1 − R(T )
1 − R(T )
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(B.11)

R(T ) is then evaluated using the serial expansion and binomial expansion. In the
process, two simplifications are made in order to reduce then number of terms. The first one
is that −λ(N − 1) in Equation B.9 is replaced by −λN . The second one is that it is assumed
that λM N T is less than 1. Then the lower and upper bounds of MTTF become:
2
2
−
T
<
M
T
T
F
<
.
M T λ2 N 2
M T λ2 N 2

(B.12)

Both simplifications make the results of the model more conservative, but the difference is noticeable only when the memory size is greater than 1 GB. The original derivation
of this model can be found in [10].
B.3

Edmonds’ Deterministic Model
Edmonds’ deterministic model is another model for SEC/DED memory with deter-

ministic scrubbing, and its derivation is presented in [11]. The original paper uses some
notations that are different from this dissertation. In order to keep the uniformity of this
dissertation, we will keep using the same notations here. This model is based on the following
assumptions:
• Transient faults occur with a Poisson distribution.
• All the bit flips are statistically independent.
• A second bit flip in a single word does not correct the first one.
• Every bit has an error rate of λ.
The derivation starts with deriving the probability that a single word with N bits
has a SEC/DED failure:

P1W C = 1 − (1 − P1B )N − N P1B (1 − P1B )N −1 ,
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(B.13)

where P1B is the probability that a single bit will flip in the scrub interval T and P1B =
1 − e−λT . Therefore:
P1W C = 1 − eλN T − N (1 − eλT )eλ(N −1)T .

(B.14)

Note that by comparing the above equation to Equation B.8, we can get that P1W C =
1 − r0 (t). This makes sense because the probability of having 0 or 1 bit error plus the probability of having 2 or more bit errors should be 1. This indicates that Saleh’s deterministic
model and Edmonds’ deterministic model take different paths in their derivation, but they
give the same result so far.
The upper bound of P1W C is given by:
1
P1W C ≤ N (N − 1)(1 − e−λT )2 .
2

(B.15)

Because the upper bound of 1 − e−λT is that 1 − e−λT ≤ λT , Equation B.15 can be further
extended to:
1
P1W C ≤ N (N − 1)λ2 T 2 .
2

(B.16)

Then the probability that exactly K SEC/DED failures occur in the memory over
L scrubbing intervals is calculated. It can be expressed by the well know equation for “K
successes in LT trials”:

PSEC (K) =

(M · L)!
· P K (1 − P1W C )M L−K .
K!(M L − K)! 1W C

(B.17)

Then the expected number of SEC/DED failures during a mission is calculated from

Nexp =

ML
X

K · PSEC (K).

K=1
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(B.18)

Substituting Equation B.17 into this equation and using the binomial theorem gives

Nexp = M LP1W C .

(B.19)

So the expected SEC/DED failure rate averaged over time LT is:

RateSEC =

Nexp
M · P1W C
=
.
LT
T

(B.20)

Substituting Equation B.16 into this equation gives
1
RateSEC ≤ M N (N − 1)λ2 T.
2

(B.21)

The MTTF is the reciprocal of RateSEC :

MT T F ≥

2
M T λ2 N (N

− 1)

.

(B.22)

In the derivation, we take upper bounds twice for the sake of simplification, and this
results in a conservative MTTF result. By comparing Equation B.21 and Equation B.12, we
notice that the two equations give similar results. The difference is that Saleh’s equation has
a term N 2 in the denominator, and in Edmonds’ equation this term is replaced by N (N − 1).
This is due to a simplification in the derivation of Saleh’s model, which is over-pessimistic.
Therefore, Edmonds’ deterministic model gives more accurate MTTF estimates than Saleh’s
deterministic model. In real applications, N is usually 18, 36, or 72, therefore the difference
between the two models is small.
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